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1 INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this thesis is to thoroughly analyze one of the latest subsets of critical 
geopolitics – popular geopolitics – in an attempt to uncover mutual relations, intertwining 
complexities between the traditional world of geopolitics (practical and formal – as 
envisaged by critical geopolitician Gearóid Ó Tuathail and his innovative tripartite 
scheme) and popular media. Thus, through the scope of magazines, comic books, movies, 
music, videogames and, to a lesser extent, news networks, we will research and assess the 
influence of geopolitics on the aforementioned forms of popular media and vice versa. In 
other words, our thesis will be centered on the reflection of the political world and events 
surrounding us in these often newly emerging sources of entertainment and information 
available to masses. Despite popular geopolitics gaining more academic prominence as 
late as in the 1980s with the emergence of critical geopolitics and its complex 
understanding involving a plethora of phenomena, discursive analyses and daunting 
criticism of a one-dimensional perception of our world, one is indeed compelled to point 
out that media and politics intertwined and exerted influence on each other much sooner.   
 In the first chapter we will briefly assess the turbulent development of the term 
geopolitics and its consequent scientific branch that of which origins can be traced back to 
the very beginning of the 20th century. Based mostly on the teachings of Swedish, German 
and Anglo-American geopolitical schools we will shortly describe the ideas of the most 
significant and influential pioneers from these three, sometimes contending and 
occasionally permeating, schools and their impact on tumultuous years before, between 
and during the world wars. Geopolitics, in a broader sense, embodies a rather realistic 
approach to international politics and emphasizes the role of territory and resources in 
shaping the foreign policies of states and their perceptions of e.g. threats, national 
interests, etc. Furthermore, when a Swedish professor of political science, Rudolf Kjellén, 
coined this portmanteau in 1899, there were indeed other contributing factors apart from 
the novelty of this particular term that propelled its widespread popularity.   
 However, the very first notions of geopolitics had been conceived of two years 
before Kjellén’s term made manifest. Friedrich Ratzel, a German geographer, merged the 
then ubiquitous and widely acknowledged ideas of Darwinism with various theories of 
states. Thus, he produced the soon to be abused organic theory of state through which he 
advocated the states’ need to grow in order to thrive. Also, he is believed to have been the 
chief mastermind behind the coinage of the infamous and soon widely abused term 
“Lebensraum”. Other notable geopolitical authors whose teachings and impacts on the 
  
                                                                                                                                              
  
 
 2 
 
course of events in the 20th century will be elucidated include Karl Haushofer, who 
provided the necessary intellectual basis for Hitler’s Germany, American admiral Alfred 
Mahan and his conviction about the irreplaceable role of sea power and choking points 
and critical geostrategist Nicholas J. Spykman, who elaborated upon and altered Mahan’s 
theories.   
 Nevertheless, as WWII unfolded, geopolitics, in the eyes of the West, became 
increasingly associated and inevitably intermingled with Nazi Germany, which became a 
decisive precursor to the post-war decline of this term and the loss of trustworthiness due 
to being indelibly stained by Nazism. Despite geopolitics dropping out of the mainstream 
discourse of post-war years, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, is often credited 
with the revival of geopolitics in the USA in the 1970s. Kissinger advocated the need to 
employ a more flexible approach to deeply entrenched loggerheads with the USSR and 
explore new possibilities of bypassing the traditional black and white perception of the 
Cold War reality. Therefore, his major contribution to the renewed flourishing of 
geopolitics will be discussed in the first chapter as well.  
 Later in the 1980s, as several intellectuals were cautiously revisiting geopolitics 
once again, various events in international politics during the previous decades paved the 
way for critical geopolitics and its altered conception of this science. A myriad of authors 
such as Haraway, Tuathail, Dalby and Agnew, began, belatedly, incorporating intellectual 
currents already present elsewhere in the social sciences. Thus, a new approach was born 
that emphasizes discourses, poststructuralism and the inability to fully comprehend 
complex geopolitical relations without including languages, culture, popular media and 
their reproduction of events. Hence, these authors were the ones who brought popular 
geopolitics and its relevancy for academic research to the fore. In the 1990s, however, 
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington postulated an intrepid post-Cold War thesis on a 
new world order formulated in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World order, in which he challenged traditional schools and theories of geopolitics and 
sought to revolutionize our understanding of international relations by introducing the 
concept of the clash of civilizations. However fallible his thesis soon proved to be and 
despite almost unanimous criticism by the academic community, it constituted a welcome 
intellectual framework in America in the wake of 9/11. The final pages of the first chapter 
will thus be dedicated to a brief evaluation of the shifting state of geopolitics in the 21st 
century and will attempt to grasp its constantly evolving character that today, to a certain 
extent, blurs the line between geopolitics, international relations and globalization. 
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 After this introduction to geopolitics and a brief historical summary we will focus 
on popular geopolitics, its development throughout the 20th century and several relevant 
case studies to illustrate the firm link between politics and its reflection through the prism 
of popular media. The author seeks to argue that popular geopolitics did not come into 
existence once critical geopoliticians experienced a sudden epiphany and embraced 
elements of the social sciences, but rather that it has accompanied and mirrored the world 
of politics since the actual inception of geopolitics. Afterwards, this analytical chapter 
will be divided into several parts ranging from comic books, movies, over magazines and 
music to videogames in order to cover the most significant and influential sources of 
popular media. Furthermore, each subchapter will comprise a case study to exemplify our 
findings and claims. Albeit being confined to American popular culture, we will seek to 
demonstrate the worldwide appeal, the enticement of various case studies and their 
indispensable role in conveying messages and shaping the audiences’ perceptions of and 
around our world.  
 After a short introduction to popular geopolitics, its short-term development, 
milestones and current methodologies, we will first and foremost explore the intriguing 
history of Captain America comic books, which originated as early as 1941, their struggle 
to maintain audience in the WWII aftermath and a unique issue called retroactive 
continuity introduced in order to tap into the shifting heart of American society in the 
1960s. It is indeed reasonable to believe that throughout its history spanning across more 
than six decades, Captain America has very closely followed America’s own search for 
identity in the bipolar Cold War reality as well as afterwards and again in the 9/11 
aftermath. As such, it constitutes a unique source of popular media worth conducting 
research and elaborating upon. 
 Afterwards, a popular magazine called the Reader’s Digest and its highly skeptical 
views of the Soviet Union especially before and during the Cold War will be thoroughly 
analyzed. Joanne Sharp argues that the Reader’s Digest helped shape the American 
perception of the Cold War through its selection and editorial presentation of articles and 
stories on the USSR. Hence, we can witness almost a steady stream of articles regarding 
the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union and its oppressive behavior toward subservient 
citizens. However narrowed the vision of American political identity was, in the post-
Cold War period the Reader’s Digest has sought to incorporate a myriad of other foreign 
as well as domestic threats to America, yet still holding on to the relatively non-
democratic nature of the Russian Federation. The former claim appears to reflect the 
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sudden post-Cold War vacuum, the hollowness of traditional threats, while the latter, in 
the author’s opinion, very aptly depicts the deeply entrenched American perception of the 
USSR that even more than two decades of subsiding once tensed loggerheads failed to 
succeed in erasing. The importance of such a popular magazine needs not to be omitted 
from our analysis and may enable us to better fathom, in terms of cultural elements, the 
still-persisting rivalries between these two countries while we witness the actual limits of 
the current methodologies of popular geopolitics.  
 Then, the celluloid world of cinematography will be introduced to this thesis. The 
film industry is generally agreed to have greatly contributed to debates over historical 
accuracy, political agendas and dominant social tendencies. Thus, while providing mass 
entertainment, film companies have long collaborated with governments to convey 
various, even politically affected, messages. Building upon some inter-war movies that 
deftly demonstrate a strong link between the government lending military equipment to 
producers on the one hand, and the heroic messages celebrating glorious America’s 
victories on the other, the James Bond phenomenon will then be properly analyzed and 
contextualized in the heated period of the 1960s and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite 
originally being a British invention, we will strive to demonstrate its unquestionable 
influence on America and the shift in main antagonists as well as locations it has 
correspondingly undergone in the post-Cold War period and in the wake of 9/11. In 
addition, applying the framework of reception theory so that we may better comprehend 
the contrastive messages such movies can convey will constitute an essential element 
which will permeate all case studies presented in this bachelor’s thesis. Thus, James Bond 
movies will mark the third case study of this chapter. 
 Music (mostly the country genre) as a powerful vehicle for the articulation of 
dissent and resistance, has often served governments to rally support for particular forms 
of nationalism. Beginning with several oppressed music artists, the author intends to 
emphasize the relevance of such a kind of music and its underlining, positive as well as 
negative, influence on relatively recent political events – e.g. the Vietnam War, 9/11 and 
the War in Iraq. In order to do fulfill that, the Dixie Chicks band and their rather 
unintentional engagement with geopolitical issues surrounding the War on Terror will be 
properly contextualized against the shifting nature of country music in the post-9/11 era.  
 Afterwards, we will assess a relatively recent phenomenon – videogames – and its 
firm, yet strongly overlooked, connection with geopolitics. As one of the most persuasive 
and expressive forms of entertaining media related to the visual turn in social sciences and 
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emerging due to the precipitous development of informational technologies, we shall 
discuss the irreplaceable position of this form of popular entertainment when one seeks to 
fathom popular geopolitics in its complexity. Although often condemned by academics, 
subject to criticism and deemed irrelevant and unworthy of exploring, the author will 
endeavor to justify and demonstrate their relevancy for academic research in the light of 
daunting prejudice and bias these intriguing representations of popular culture face. 
Drawing from one of the the best-selling videogame franchises – Call of Duty – we will 
attempt to analyze how much the contemporary American geopolitical perception of our 
world is projected into this form of entertainment. Also, we should not omit the inclusion 
of the research of the extent to which traditional American stereotypes regarding the rest 
of the world have persevered throughout the many decades of the 20th century and how 
these exact stereotypes construct geopolitical space surrounding us. While uncovering the 
shifts in the narrative of videogames in the post-9/11 period and applying them to Call of 
Duty, we will seek to establish a possible link between societal transformation and trends 
in videogames in the 21st century. 
 The conclusion will summarize the main points of all the chapters and subchapters 
and will attempt to hint at a somehow congealed development of traditional geopolitics as 
well as popular geopolitics, the challenges they need to address and the crossroad 
contemporary geopolitics stands on. 
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2 THE ORIGINS OF GEOPOLITICS 
2.1 The development of geopolitics prior to WWI 
The innovative portmanteau “geopolitics” is believed to have been coined by a Swedish 
professor of political science, Rudolf Kjellén,1 in 1899. Such an original term gained 
much prominence and attracted interest of many a scientist simply because it hinted at 
novelty, at thorough exploration of geographical dimensions of states – e.g. borders, 
natural resources, environmental conditions – which presuppose these international actors 
to behave and act in a certain way on the world stage.2 However, to better comprehend 
this somehow elusive and ambiguous term, one is indeed compelled to properly 
contextualize the inception of the science of geopolitics in the turbulent development of 
the late 19th century, which constitutes an indispensable cornerstone for the emergence of 
what would later be dubbed classical geopolitics.  
 Albeit emitting a rather unstable perception mired in the political reality as the 
scramble for Africa drew to its close, Dodds brings up three main contributing factors that 
assisted in establishing geopolitics as a distinct branch of science. In his view, economic 
nationalism and trade protectionism began intermingling with foreign policies of mostly 
France and Britain as these two colonial empires grew uncertain and increasingly 
precarious regarding the unprecedented rise of the United States of America and its 
potential for altering the already perilous balance of trade. Thus, he surmises that one 
must bear in mind the aforementioned scramble for Africa and the fervent search for new 
colonial acquisitions when describing the origins of geopolitics.3 While France and 
Britain vied for dominance, exhibited mutual antipathies and were immersed in heated 
encounters in North Africa,4 the latter strove to contain Russia in Central Asia and 
engaged in rearmament in order to counter Germany’s bid for influence in Europe prior to 
First World War.  
                                               
1 Later a Conservative member of the Swedish parliament infamous for his hard-line and jingoistic 
perception of Swedish nationalism as well as foreign policy designs. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very 
Short Introduction. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25. 
2 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), 2, 
38. 
3 18 million square kilometers of new territory and thirty new colonies and protectorates very aptly illustrate 
and attest the tremendous expansiveness of European empires in the late 19th century, which resulted in the 
control of almost 90% of landmass by Europeans on the verge of the 20th century. Gearóid  Ó Tuathail, 
Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1996), 1. For more, see: Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1989), 
245 – 355.  
4 Such as the infamous incident at Fashoda. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: 
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 245 – 355. 
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 Furthermore, Dodds believes the emergence of universities allowing assiduous 
assessments of the newly established field of geography to be of crucial importance worth 
incorporating into the evaluation of determinants concerning the compelling debates the 
rise of geopolitics elicited.5 In another elucidating book titled Global Geopolitics Dodds 
raises four additional aspects of geopolitics that are generally agreed upon, acquiesced by 
the vast majority of geopoliticians and well applicable to the abovementioned traditional 
geopolitical approach. Classical geopolitics has always been concerned with perceiving 
the world in its entirety, hence the geo- prefix.  
 (1.) Such a global perception, a big picture of our world, thus enables us to fathom 
reality through the prism of a detached and unbiased observer who endeavours to position 
himself as being objective, neutral and simply interpreting the geo-political reality he or 
she6 bears witness to. (2.) In addition, almost all geopolitical strategists placed much 
importance upon maps7 and the overall visual approach to international politics in order to 
convey their findings and predictions and to attempt to somehow explain8 via a single 
encompassing frame the history of international politics, the shifting present and the 
possible future of major conflict regions, fault lines and areas of pivotal significance.9 (3.) 
Also, geopolitics is considered to be driven by a desire to advise states, to provide them 
with meaningful, credible analyses of international politics with which to accommodate to 
the ever-changing reality and adapt to foreign and security challenges. (4.) The final 
feature of classical geopolitics as contended by Dodds revolves around the fact that most 
geopolitical authors imbue their visionary assessments with national partisanship and 
therefore explore global geopolitics from a very narrow-minded perspective strongly 
inclining toward and advocating nationalism, sometimes even bordering on imperialism, 
in the lieu of cross-cultural understandings.10 
                                               
5 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 26. 
6 As much as the author does not intend to marginalize anyone, men were usually the ones being drawn to 
geopolitical theorizing. Nevertheless, as will be analyzed in later chapters, Joanne P. Sharp succeeded in 
gaining universal acclaim thanks to her illuminating assessment of the baffling role the magazine Reader’s 
Digest played in condensing the Cold War. 
7 Heartland, Land and Sea Power, Crescents and many other terms serve to exhibit the crucial role of maps 
in transmitting geopolitical and spatial ideas.  
8 This was especially the case for British geostrategist Halford J. Mackinder who brought forth, as we will 
build up upon later, the division of history into three phases – pre-Columbian, Columbian and post-
Columbian. Gearóid  Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 19 – 21, 65 – 70.  Halford J. Mackinder, “The 
Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23 (1904): 28 – 50. 
9 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 2 – 3. 
10 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 2 – 3. 
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 Friedman in his challenging thesis regarding the next one hundred years employs a 
slightly altered and broader approach toward defining the term geopolitics. He argues11 
that one should not omit the inseparable connection between international relations and 
the world of geopolitical forecasts. Interestingly enough, he assumes the main function of 
geopolitics to be the unique ability to predict behavior of international actors and, 
therefore, the future shape of international system. Thus, Friedman postulates that both 
geopolitics and economics consider players to be rational.12 He then draws an apt 
metaphor between international politics and a chess game. While at the first glance it 
would seem that each player has a wide range of moves with which to execute his 
strategy, once the player ameliorates his skills, it enables him or her to better (fore)see the 
suddenly narrowed possibilities, which makes his or her moves more predictable.13  
 By no means should one suppose the already predetermined outcomes of such a 
power game, yet, as Friedman remarks, even the most brilliant leader of Iceland would 
not be able to turn this country into a major power, nor would the most feeble-minded 
emperor of the Roman Empire succeed in completely undermining its far-reaching 
power.14 Therefore, elaborating upon this and linking it to geopolitics, it remains apparent 
that geopolitical forecasting, while taking into account the confinements of geography and 
all related phenomena, allows us to view international politics as at least partially driven 
by certain rules deeply entrenched and rooted in geographical factors as well as in 
constant encounters among states. Such an intricate enmeshment thus offers us a way to 
predict, in a broad and general sense, possible future directions of states and the 
underlining characteristics of their behaviors shaped to a great extent by geographical 
conditions.15 
 Before moving on to particular representatives and the most significant authors of 
geopolitics, the author intends to raise another perspective regarding the origins of 
geopolitics contrived by Gérard Tuathail who opted for a more critical approach and 
added a few additional issues the author deems essential. According to Tuathail, it is 
indeed remarkable that the original set of overwhelmingly male intellectuals from various 
national backgrounds and cultures reached a widely shared view on international affairs.16 
For this apparent contradiction, one must bear in mind their inevitably imperialistic 
                                               
11 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years, (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 10 – 12. 
12 This meant that during the Cold War geopolitics practically became a domain, a bastion of realism. 
George Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 12 – 13. 
13 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 13. 
14 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 13. 
15 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 12. 
16 Gearóid  Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 16 – 20. 
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inclinations that propelled them to promote an imperialist agenda, which, of course, 
presumes the inferiority of other non-Western civilizations and favors capitalism over 
other forms of economic production. Moreover, when one carefully analyses these white 
supremacist assumptions, a stream of thought commonly known as Social Darwinism 
immediately comes to mind. Such a scientific “justification” for the supposed superiority 
of European races very well dovetails with the emphasis on the key role of environment17 
as the main determining factor in the process of evolution.  Apart from highlighting the 
modification of organisms by their environment, Tuathail offers another possible 
cornerstone for the emergence of geopolitics in the late 19th century – Cartesian 
rationalism.18 From a philosophical point of view, this particular perception of our world 
sought to witness and grasp the surrounding reality, rather than interpret it. In doing so, 
Cartesian rationalism basically laid the foundation for theorists of realism who also 
attempted to enframe our world, depict it as unchanging and driven by universal laws.19  
 Last but not least, one should not discard various cultural phenomena on the brink 
of the 20th century. The fin de siècle movement, together with Modernists, seeking to 
venture beyond the fading mainstream geographical discourse and threatening to 
undermine the credibility of traditional geographical gazes on international politics, 
blossomed into a serious challenge that especially Great Britain through geostrategist 
Halford J. Mackinder acknowledged.20 Tuathail deems Mackinder’s all-encompassing 
thesis on a globalized world of international interactions to be “a triumphalist blind to its 
own precariousness.”21 Reinforcing Mackinder’s imperialist perspective was a plethora of 
invasion novels which gained considerable popularity in the 1870 – 1914 period, such as 
G. Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking (1871), In the Street and Smith's "Bound to Win" 
series and others22 who threatened to undermine the classical, mostly imperial, 
geopolitical gaze. Let us now turn attention to the most significant theorists of geopolitics, 
whose paradigms and perceptions will be elaborated upon and set against the backdrop of 
the unfolding 20th century. 
 
 
                                               
17 Gearóid  Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 17. 
18 Gearóid  Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 17 – 18. 
19 Gearóid  Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 18 – 20. 
20 He even went as far as to suggest the “end of geography.” Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 21. 
Parallels with F. Fukuyama are purely coincidential. 
21 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 26.  
22 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A very Short Introduction, 26. 
  
                                                                                                                                              
  
 
 10 
 
2.1.1 Friedrich Ratzel – the pioneer of organic geopolitics in Germany 
As argued above, despite the apparent elusiveness and slipperiness of the actual origins of 
the science of geopolitics, Friedrich Ratzel, a towering individual of geography in 
Germany and a passionate espouser of Darwinism23 must not be omitted from our brief 
overview of significant geopolitical authors from various competing schools. After all, he 
represents the chief mastermind behind seven general laws of state through which he 
argued the ubiquitous need of states for ever increasing space and a constant competitive 
struggle in order for nations24 to sustain themselves, nourish their civilizations and thrive 
– lebensraum, “living space.” This particular theory, later dubbed Organic theory of the 
state, was published in his highly influential book titled Politische Geographie as early as 
1897.25 One is indeed compelled to draw parallels between his “natural” postulation and 
the survival of the fittest as advocated by Darwin.26  
 In another book The Sea as a Source of the Greatness of a People (1901) he 
identified both the land and sea as prospective opportunities to seek territorial expansion 
and engage in a supposedly ceaseless cycle of rise and fall as great powers struggle to 
secure their lebensraum(s).27 As we shall later witness, others further elaborated upon the 
latter potential opportunity.28 To catch up with other colonial powers and to further the 
tumultuous quest for lebensraum, Ratzel fiercely campaigned for extensive colonial 
acquisitions in Africa under Germany’s supervision.29 Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that Ratzel provided the necessary incentive, the initial spark that blossomed into the 
creation of ferociously right-wing political parties, imbued them with the scent of a 
scientific justification, which gained historical momentum in interwar Germany. 
 
2.1.2 Rudolf Kjellén – the founding father of imperial geopolitics 
As envisioned at the very beginning of this chapter, a Swedish professor of political 
science who, unexpectedly, happened to be Ratzel’s disciple, constitutes the founding 
                                               
23 Who began his academic career in 1868 when he completed his PhD in zoology. Also, Charles Darwin 
and his teaching embodied in On the origin of species, which gained much prominence in united Germany 
under Wilhelm I. and, more importantly, Otto von Bismarck, helped erode the discourse of many scientific 
branches. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics,  28 – 29. 
24 States, used interchangeably. 
25 Freidrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1897). 
26 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 2010), 3. 
27 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 28. For  more, see: Ratzel Friedrich, The Sea as a 
Source of the Greatness of a People (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1902). 
28 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 27 – 29. 
29 Gearóid  Ó Tuathail,Critical Geopolitics, 28 – 30.  
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father of the term “geopolitics,” which was coined in 1899 in an article on boundaries as a 
blend-word that catered to the turbulent circumstances, the increasingly eroded traditional 
geopolitical gaze vis-à-vis the shifting balance of power and various cultural phenomena 
as the 20th century began unfolding.30 One of his chief contributions lies in perceiving the 
state and society synergistically31 – in other words viewed through the lenses of 
inseparable cooperation and interaction – and hence fusing these to devise an 
indistinguishable conglomerate of both.  
 Apart from emphasizing similar organic aspects as Ratzel, Kjellen’s works need to 
be properly set against the backdrop of a dissolving Swedish-Norwegian union, a 
regrettable deed which elicited a conservative reaction in the wake of his personal failure 
to prevent this, rather peaceful, dissolution from occurring.32 Furthermore, he fully 
endorsed Germany’s bid for dominance on the brink of the 20th century, because, 
similarly to Ratzel, he also advocated that the future lay with spatial, autarkic (self-
sufficient) and continental empires with contiguous territory bound by e.g. railways.33 On 
an intriguing note, his interpretation of World War I as a violent clash between the ideas 
of 178934 and those of 191435 – published under the title Ideas of 1914 (1915)36 – proved 
immensely popular in interwar Germany and went through as many as twenty-two 
editions, with Karl Haushofer being the last editor.37 
 
2.1.3 Alfred Mahan – naval power at its finest 
Born into a military family, Mahan experienced a rather mediocre career in the American 
Navy, however, his unquestionable importance and worldwide acclaim came as a 
consequence of a book titled The Influence of Seapower, 1660 – 1783 (1890),38 in which 
he sought to formulate a timeless thesis, same as many authors before39 and after, on the 
paramount importance of the abovementioned type of power. Popular works of grand 
                                               
30 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 25. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics 
and Identity, 3 – 4. 
31 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 3 – 4. 
32 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 34.  
33 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 33 – 34. 
34 Freedom, equality and fraternity championed by France and Britain. Rudolf Kjellén, Ideas of 1914 
(Leipzig: Hirzel, 1915). 
35 Order, righteousness and national solidarity represented by Germany that would, according to him, 
emerge victorious and triumph as the post-Columbian era drew to its close. Rudolf Kjellén, Ideas of 1914. 
Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 34. 
36 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 34 
37 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 34. 
38 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660 – 1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1890). 
39 Such as Themistocles, Thucydides or Xenophon to name a few. 
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history that strive to employ an all-encompassing approach in order to envelop one 
particular phenomenon – naval power in this case – in a lucid and intelligible explanation 
are always bound to entice the readers and arouse fervent debates40 even when the actual 
credibility of their assumptions rests on flimsy foundations and unconvincing arguments. 
Apart from influencing Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II. and admiral Tirpitz, Mahan’s forte 
lies in his concise ability to illustrate a few general principles describing the entire history 
of naval warfare and thus allowing even commoners to fathom the sheer complexity, even 
though significantly simplified and occasionally misleading, of sea power.41 As Tuathail 
insightfully remarks, “Mahan’s [presumptions] became pithy generalizations and 
epigrammatic statements that lent his writings an aura of sagacity and expertise.”42  
 Mahan is then best understood as a representative of the Anglo-American strand of 
(classical) geopolitics who argued that controlling commerce and certain key naval points 
around the globe equals to achieving the decisive victory over the enemy’s fleet.43 In his 
fatherland, Mahan’s work was celebrated as a robust defense and a compelling manifesto 
for the enlargement of America’s Navy just as Theodore Roosevelt and his reformist 
companions were about to embark upon a more expansive, in terms of commerce and 
territory, policy.44 However, Mahan’s comprehensible teachings and appealing 
postulations defending the traditional belief in the White Man’s Burden, proliferating the 
superiority of Anglo-Saxons and warning on the “Yellow Peril” found fertile soil in 
Japan.45 Subjected to intense research viciously elaborated upon, Dittmer reveals that this 
exact geopolitical philosophy46 lay at the heart of Japan’s expansive foreign policy and 
the ensuing attack on Pearl Harbor.47 Also, under the current administration of Barack 
Obama, Mahan’s significance of sea power and trade routes marked a resounding return 
in terms of a strategy titled “a pivot to Asia.”48 
 
                                               
40 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 30. Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama, among others, 
send their cordial greetings. 
41 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 31 – 32. 
42 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 31. 
43 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 4 – 5.. 
44 This crucial intellectual impetus provided by Mahan proved indeed very convient when America 
obliterated the remnants of the once grand Spanish Armada around Cuba in 1898. Robert Kagan, 
Nebezpečný národ (Praha: Lidové noviny, 2008), 411, 431. 
45 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 32. 
46 That of the irreplaceable role of commerce and key naval bases. 
47 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 4 – 5. Keiichi Takeuchi, “Geopolitics and 
Geography in Japan Reexamined,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 12, no. 1 (1980): 14 – 24.  
48 “Rise of China and the Return of Great Power Politics,” Aegis Americana, last modified April 14, 2014, 
http://aegisamericana.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/rise-of-china-and-the-return-of-great-power-politics/. 
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2.1.4 Halford J. Mackinder – the struggle for global heartland 
In 1904, on January 25, Mackinder presented a text labeled “The Geographical Pivot of 
History”49 during his momentous address to the Royal Geographical Society. A fervent 
proponent of the British Empire50 who opted to engage in geopolitics amidst heated 
debates regarding the declining British Empire and its untenable future, it is of vital 
importance to take into account the period of shifting geopolitical reality to which Britain 
attempted to adapt and modernize.51 According to Mackinder, geography had already 
reached its heyday through a circumferential mission, which marked the end of the 
Columbian epoch – 400 years of (mostly) European spatial expansionism – and thus was 
about to enter a brand new era epitomized by the “end of geography.52 Interestingly 
enough, he remarked that the world of international interactions had been made global as 
early as 1904. He then went on to define the new epoch – Post-Columbian – characterized 
by the omnipresent struggle for relative efficiency among imperial states rather than by 
the old scramble for territorial expansion.  
 To deconstruct his global geopolitical gaze, the economy in the years leading to 
WWI, was by no means truly global, interconnected or interdependent.53 Yet behind his 
sincere intentions to safeguard and conserve Britain as the leading world power it is once 
again possible to uncover several traces of the Cartesian perspective, which impels a keen 
observer to become detached and removed from the worldwide stage he or she seeks to 
interpret.54 Thus, Mackinder’s spectacle comprised a three-scene conflict55 that vividly 
depicted a clash between major protagonists of east/west, the Roman and the Greek, 
Europe and Asia or even land power and sea power. Such distinctive cleavages indeed 
                                               
49 Halford J Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23 (1904): 28 – 50.  
50 And an experienced climber who scaled the heights of Mount Kenya prior to 1904 so that he could 
establish his reputation as and credentials of a “manly” geographer. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical 
Geopolitics, 24. 
51 Even Paul Kennedy hinted at the lack of innovation in the Empire’s economy, which, while facing the 
emerging USA, assertive and later belligerent Japan and Bismark’s Germany, began increasingly faltering 
and struggled to maintain the status quo antes as other major players around the globe ascended the world 
stage and started eclipsing Britain economically as well as militarily during the process. Also, the Boer War, 
the most humiliating and the bloodiest clash Britain participated in between 1815 – 1914, is believed to 
have overstretched Britain’s economic as well as military capacity. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 245 – 355. 
52 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 18 – 20. Halford J Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of 
History,” 28 – 50. 
53 Despite the fact that Europeans and their descendants controlled almost 90% of territories, in which 
Britain alone supervised around ¼ of the land. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: 
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 290. 
54 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 22 – 24. 
55 Pre-Columbian, Columbian and post-Columbian. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 18 – 20. 
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accounted for quite an impressive historical display and added much intellectual 
credibility to his geopolitical view.56  
 Thus, portraying Mackinder’s lecture as theater about theater consisting of 
overlapping maps entailing a pivot area,57 an inner/outer marginal crescent58 and 
outer/insular crescents59 constitutes a fitting metaphor.60 Furthermore, Dittmer argues that 
Mackinder, being well aware of the naval power Mahan-influenced America wielded, 
directed attention toward the abovementioned sea-immune pivot area under the 
dominance of Russia against which the USA was supposed to ensure its containment. A 
policy, one might argue, adopted a few decades later in the form of Truman’s Cold War 
doctrine.61 Also, his insightful postulations about the aspects of an empire and the 
importance of pivotal areas abounding with natural resources were resurrected in the 
aftermath of the first Gulf War as well as 9/11.62  
 
2.2 Interwar period – geopolitics circumscribes the entire world 
As Woodrow Wilson, Britons and the French (among other nations) were preoccupied 
with the immediate aftermath of WWI at Versailles and hastily sowing the wind of yet 
another devastating conflict mere two decades later, Mackinder’s geopolitical thinking 
blossomed into his most famous and celebrated postulation as he attempted to elaborate 
upon his pre-war thesis: 1. Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland,63 2. Who 
rules the Heartland commands the World Island,64 3. Who rules the World Island 
commands the world.65 Despite having little immediate impact in the Anglo-American 
world, it was subject to more detailed scrutiny in Germany thanks to the leading figure of 
                                               
56 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 24. Halford J Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” 
28 – 50. 
57 Today’s Russia, Caucasus, former Soviet sattelites etc.  
58 Peculiarly enough, these crescents were represented by “marginal” countries and regions such as Britain, 
Europe, the Middle East, India, China and Japan. Halford J Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of 
History,” 28 – 50. 
59 These crescents encompassed both Americas and the Pacific Rim. Halford J Mackinder, “The 
Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23 (1904): 28 – 50. 
60 For a more visual view of his interpretation of the world he sought to enframe, see the appendices. 
61 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 4 – 5. 
62 Jennifer Hyndman, “Revisitin Mackinder 1904 – 2004,” The Geographical Journal 170, no. 4 (2004): 
380 – 383. 
63 Predominantly. 
64 Arabia, Southeast Asia, China, most of Africa, etc. 
65 Halford J Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, 135 – 
138.  
  
                                                                                                                                              
  
 
 15 
 
the German strand of geopolitics – Karl Haushofer.66 Intriguingly enough, Mackinder also 
fiercely advocated the creation of new nation-states (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia or 
Hungary) that would form a backbone, however vulnerable one, of a buffer zone between 
Germany and Russia in their perennial struggle for Heartland.67 
 Assessing retrospectively, the interwar period has become known as, among other 
labels, a birthplace of a (new) academic discipline called International Relations.68 Yet a 
crucial distinction must be made between the abovementioned discipline and geopolitics. 
The earliest proponents of international relations, later labeled idealists, employed a 
slightly different approach toward global tensions than geopoliticians, highlighted the 
actual causes of mostly political friction and devoted much effort into conflict resolution 
and mediation in general. Furthermore, “idealists” firmly believed that enframing our 
world in all-encompassing institutions – the League of Nations first and foremost – would 
contribute toward a peaceful resolution of conflicts.69  
 On the other hand, as Dodds remarks, early geopoliticians concerned themselves 
with reciprocal interactions between states, territories and its geographical determinants 
rather than with bettering the condition of the world.70 In spite of sharing certain common 
aspects sheltered by political realism, these two contesting fields later diverged even more 
significantly as geopolitics further divided into a modicum of categories because of a 
blatant absence of a single, far-reaching and universal geopolitical definition. A bold and 
daring attempt to reconcile geopolitics and international relations was made by Isaiah 
Bowman, a prominent American interwar geopolitician who published various writings 
on geopolitical subjects blended with idealism.71 
 Yet one must also bear in mind that geopolitics in the interwar period comprised 
many other phenomena than its most controversial, alleged association with Nazism and a 
fitting justification to redraw the unstable map of Europe and amend harsh restrictions 
imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Dodds offers a myriad of 
illuminating, mostly European, examples that serve to showcase the indispensable 
                                               
66 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues (Oxford: Praeger, 2011), 17 – 18. Haushofer was 
believed to approve of a German-Soviet alliance in order to obliterate the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Nevertheless, Adolf Hitler slightly diverged from Haushofer’s original intentions. 
67 Charles B. Hagan, “Geopolitics,” The Journal of Politics 4, no. 4 (1942): 480 – 481. 
68 The mythical establishment of international relations as a distinct academic field within the Department of 
International Politics at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth does not need to be further debated here. 
Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction , 27. 
69 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction , 27 – 28. 
70 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction , 27 – 28. 
71 Such as The New World (1921), Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences (1934). Klaus Dodds, 
Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction , 27 – 28. Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 10. 
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significance of geopolitical ideas – In Portugal, with the emergence of Salazar’s regime, 
the Portuguese embarked upon a task to appeal to a wider Portuguese-speaking world, 
Italy saw the rise of a new journal titled Geopolitica in order to facilitate Italian ambitions 
in the Mediterranean and Africa,72 a traditional colonial approach employed by general 
Franco’s Spain as well. Thus, we can clearly observe that other European powers opted 
for colonial issues over reshaping the increasingly wobbly continental European 
spectacle.73 Even as early as 1924 Mackinder staunchly proponed a Midland Ocean 
Alliance between Britain and America in order to counter German military renaissance 
once the fears over a possible rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union 
made manifest.74 Such a proposal of a strategic alliance indeed dovetails quite well with 
the foundation of NATO in April 1949.75  
 Before moving on to explore and assess geopolitics in interwar Germany, several 
French geographers, from the eponymous and rather dominant geopolitical school, must 
be mentioned. Albert Demangeon became known as an early user of the terms United 
States of Europe and European Community. He was well aware of France’s declining role 
and advocated its inevitable modernization should France wish to pose as a counterweight 
against increasingly assertive Germany in the 1930s. Moreover, he also came to a dim 
realization of Europe’s decline in the light of Japan’s growing power in the Far East76 and 
due to the rise of America.77 78 Yann Morvran Goblet represents another French 
geographer who, most famously, denounced German geopolitics for misleading ideas of 
geographical determinism that considered nations metaphysical79 beings.80 
                                               
72 The invasion of Abyssinia constitutes a pinnacle of these imperial endeavours. 
73 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 29 – 30. 
74 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 29 – 30. 
75 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 30. 
76 A specific policy embodied in the concept of dai-toa – the Grand Eastern Empire – which was supposed 
to justify the bloody expansion of Japan in the Far East. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 266. 
77 It is generally agreed that America was not yet ready to accept its, supposedly, predestined leading role in 
international relations and opted for turning inward, becoming isolationist, instead. However, inasmuch as 
the central topic of this bachelor’s thesis lies elsewhere, we must bear in mind that the interwar period 
witnessed a wide range of contributing factors somehow eroding this isolationist perception. See: . Paul 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
2000, 414 – 444. Robert Kagan, The World America Made (New York: Vintage Books, 2013). 
78 These passionate sentiments, together with warnings on the plethora of challenges militant Islam posed 
for Europe, were articulated in a book titled The Decline in Europe (1920). Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a 
guide to the issues, 12. 
79 Interchangeable with organic. 
80 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 12. He even went as far as to label German 
geopoliticians “alchemists who added sober fanaticism to their ideas.” Yann Morvran Goblet In: Bert 
Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 13. 
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2.2.1 Interwar Germany – congealing organic theories, reticence and 
Nazism 
To attempt to uncover the almost infinite swath of contributing factors toward the 
emergence of German geopolitics would indeed require an extensive analysis reaching far 
beyond the limits and confinement of this bachelor’s thesis, nevertheless, Chapman 
provides us with at least a basic guide to geopolitics in interwar Germany. He inferred 
several aspects stemming from Germany’s particular position and geographical 
determinants in central Europe, which, combined with an acute emphasis on the unity of 
the German Volk, organic theories of state as envisaged by Friedrich Ratzel, the strife for 
additional lebensraum and a notion of racial superiority influenced by the writings of 
Heinrich von Treitschke brought forth a rather combustive tinderbox that in the wake of 
(mostly) France’s and Britain’s impasse and interwar quagmire lay the foundation for 
unavoidably intermingling geopolitics with Nazism and staining it for decades to come.81 
82 83  
 Together with the belligerent zeal to rectify WWI defeat and redraw its frontiers as 
well as borders,84 amplified by autarkie, Drang nach Osten (drive to the east) and the 
blame put on domestic as well as foreign “traitors,” Chapman nicknames all these 
abovementioned aspects Germany’s own version of Manifest Destiny to help this 
emerging country ascend the world stage and claim its rightfully preeminent global 
power.85 86  
 
2.2.2 Karl Haushofer – the missing link between geopolitics and Nazism? 
An explicit and, one might argue, inseparable connection between geopolitics and Nazism 
was provided by Professor Karl Haushofer, a leading, seminal historical figure of 
(interwar) geopolitics. Born in 1869, he entered the German army in the period of the 
actual emergence of geopolitics as a distinctive, prominent scientific discipline throughout 
Europe and across the Atlantic. Having spent some time in Japan as an artillery adviser 
(1908 – 1910), he bore with much contention the crushing implications of the WWI defeat 
                                               
81 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 8. 
82 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 30 – 31. 
83 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 5 – 8. 
84 See: Charles B. Hagan, “Geopolitics,” The Journal of Politics 4, no. 4 (1942): 478 – 490. 
85 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 8. 
86 For a more assiduous assessment of interwar geopolitics, its terminology and theoretical framework, the 
author suggests a concise article written by Charles B. Hagan in 1942, titled simply: Geopolitics. Charles B. 
Hagan, “Geopolitics,” The Journal of Politics 4, no. 4 (1942): 478 – 490. 
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for Germany and even left the army in 1919.87 88 89 Instead, he chose to pursue an 
academic career at the age of 50 in Munich, initiated the publication of Zeitschrift für 
Geopolitik (The Journal of Geopolitics) in 1924 and helped establish the German 
Academy (1925), a towering organization that was supposed to proliferate and reinforce 
cultural ties with regions abroad and nourish the so-called Germandom. Yet in the five 
years following Hitler’s coup in 1933, this institution was transformed to serve Nazi’s 
ends and was even placed under the auspices and direct supervision of the Propaganda 
Ministry during WWII.90  
 Several elements of Haushofer’s geopolitical thinking need to be addressed. First, 
he perceived sea power as an increasingly dominant aspect of world politics and thus 
postulated the division of our world into three pan-regions with three leading powers at its 
cores: Pan-America (the USA), Eurafrica (Germany) and East Asia (Japan).91 Furthemore, 
Ratzel’s ideas of lebensraum and Kjellén’s thoughts on organic characteristics of state 
found fertile soil in Haushofer’s own teachings. He perpetuated this biologization of 
international relations and the methods of evolutionary biology and deemed natural 
science a crucial cornerstone for the study of geopolitics.92 93 Although he, himself, never 
became a Nazi, a firm link between his theories and Nazism occurred through his close 
friend, fellow participant in the Beer Hall Putsch and Hitler’s close co-perpetrator – 
Rudolf Hess – who introduced Haushofer to Hitler during his imprisonment in 1922.94 
Yet even though he conferred Hitler with a copy of Ratzel’s Political Geography while he 
was dictating Mein Kampf to Hess, it is generally conceded that Haushofer’s direct 
influence on Hitler was wildly exaggerated.95  
 Despite being labeled a proponent of Nazism, he lamented the perversion of 
German geopolitics after the Nazi coup in 1933, felt in disfavour with Hitler in Munich in 
193896 and was generally shocked and infuriated with Operation Barbarossa because 
                                               
87 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 15. 
88 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 35. 
89 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 32. 
90 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 36 – 37. Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 15. 
91 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 16. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short 
Introduction, 33. 
92 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 36. 
93 Also, Haushofer enthusiastically supported the plans to construct a Berlin-Bagdad railway so that 
Germany could project its influence in the Middle East and beyond. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short 
Introduction, 33. 
94 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 35. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 32 – 
34. 
95 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 35. 
96 A meeting to which he posed as an advisor and sought to tone down Hitler’s eastward ambitions. 
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emanating from Mackinder’s emphasis on the heartland, Haushofer argued for an 
immediate construction of an alliance entailing Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan to 
counterbalance Britain, a notion which, after attacking the Soviet Union, was left in 
tatters.97 Notwithstanding the exoneration at the Nurnberg Military Tribunals, he and his 
wife committed suicide in 1946. Hence, it sealed his unfortunate testimony to Nazi 
ideology and a gradually more bellicose behaviour of Germany prior to WWII. Yet he 
should also be remembered as an influential individual who accelerated the development 
of Japanese interwar policy and hastened the emergence of geopolitics in Latin America, 
most notably in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.98 
 
2.2.3 Nicholas J. Spykman – rimland and the limits of frontiers 
Even amidst heated military encounters during WWII, geopolitics in America, 
consequently as well as subsequently, was thriving and further elaborated upon previous 
theories postulated mostly by Mahan and Mackinder. A Dutch immigrant to the USA and 
Rockefeller’s protégé – Nicholas Spykman – sought to conceptualize geopolitics in a 
manner similar to Mahan, which led him to ambitiously believe in the preeminence of 
geography in the contested field of international relations.99 We can clearly observe that 
Spykman adamantly advocated the indispensable, paramount role of geographical factors 
when formulating national policy simply because of their permanent and everlasting 
characteristics.100 Furthemore, Spykman endeavoured to rework Mackinder’s original 
emphasis on “heartland” and instead highlighted the pivotal significance of “rimland” 
regions – areas involved in almost every major military operation in history that also 
embodied a crucial maritime highway – comprising mostly Eurasia, Africa and Australia.  
 Driven by his bitter opposition to the supposed American isolationism and 
buttressed by Japan’s own geopolitical heyday at Pearl Harbor, he strongly argued for a 
more interventionist101 American foreign policy to preclude a single power from 
                                               
97 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 37. 
98 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 37. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 32. 
Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 16. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and 
Identity, 4. 
99 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 24. 
100 “Geography does not argue; it just is.” “[...]even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed“ 
serve to give the reader a basic idea of his messianic belief in geography. Nicholas John Spykman, 
“Geography and Foreign Policy, I,” American Political Science Review 1, no. 32 (1938): 28 – 50. 
 
101 A proposal that, one recalls, became basically hegemonic in the Cold War discourse as America 
struggled for global dominance and was engaged in the European heartland from the late 1940s onwards. 
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conquering what he coined “The Old World” – Eurasia.102 103 104 Intriguingly enough, 
even if Spykman’s geopolitical gaze rested upon a blatant, and from Tuathail’s critical 
point of view even an irreconcilable, contradiction which strove to strike a precarious 
balance between the two variables of a contingent equation: “Geopolitics does not argue; 
it just is,”105 we may however observe that in 1942, at the height of WWII in Europe, 
Pacific etc., he eagerly bore witness to the deterioration of frontiers106 in European 
battlefields, lamented the loss of their original purpose in the light of the tremendous 
impact of aviation soon envisaged by Alexander De Seversky and attempted to 
foreshadow the future development of international organizations which failed to contain 
the Axis’ bid for yet another redefinition of global borders and faultlines.107  
 By acknowledging108 Alexander De Seversky’s109 arguments about the 
significance of rapidly emerging airpower, Spykman basically paved the way for the 
latter’s prominence in the pursuit of applying aerospace power alongside its land and 
naval counterparts. Thus, Seversky, a Russian American aviator, represents a tireless, 
even if a slightly stalwart, advocate of aviation in a reality keen on learning how to 
conduct air strikes and project its power beyond the land as well as maritime 
confinements in an unfolding bipolar world.110 
 
2.3 Postwar decline and the emergence of critical geopolitics 
                                                                                                                                            
Nicholas John Spykman. “Frontiers, Security, and International Organization.” Geographical Review 32, 
no. 3 (1942): 436 – 447. 
102 To cater to his attentive followers mired in America’s predestined exceptionalism, he labelled the USA 
and its allies, perhaps unsurprisingly, “The New World”. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 40. 
103 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 23. 
104 Two publications titled America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United states and the Balance of 
Power (1942) and The Geography of Peace (1944) very aptly showcase Spykman’s strenuous search for a 
power-based foreign policy with realism and Mahan’s naval supremacy at its core. Nicholas John Spykman, 
The Geography of Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1944). Nicholas John Spykman, 
American Strategy in World Politics, the United States & the Balance of Power (New York: Shoe String 
Press, 1970). 
105 For an in-depth analysis and proper contextualization of Spykman’s claim, see Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 
Critical Geopolitics, 40 – 42. 
106 Another essential geopolitical term which refers to borderlands – regions adjacent to actual borders and 
usually abouding with environmental barriers – rivers, mountains, deserts, etc. 
107 Nicholas John Spykman. “Frontiers, Security, and International Organization.” Geographical Review 32, 
no. 3 (1942): 436 – 447. 
108 Unlike Mahan or even Mackinder who staunchly defended naval power as the only viable possibility 
until the very end. 
109 In his works Seversky introduced his own version of heartland encompassing airspace above North 
America, Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. For more see: Air Power: Key to Survival (1950) or 
America: Too Young to Die (1961). Alexander De Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1950). Alexander De Seversky, America: Too Young to Die (Michigan: McGraw-Hill, 1961). 
110 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 22. 
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Having been almost inerasably stained by Nazism and Hitler’s ambitions, the once 
indispensable term “geopolitics” was gradually side-lined, its interwar credibility deeply 
undermined and the actual usage of the term deliberately eschewed. With a few minor 
exceptions, such as Professor Joseph Roucek, a Czech-born intellectual who continued 
publishing geopolitical articles on e.g. Antarctica or the spatialization of the USA, and 
Saul Cohen111 who sought to build upon Spykman’s fractured world in order to better 
fathom the ideological as well as territorial essence of the global struggle for dominance 
between America and the USSR, it remains unquestionably apparent that, in the 
immediate aftermath of WWII, geopolitics lost its historic momentum and was heavily 
overshadowed by a new reality.112 In his work, Cohen strived to concentrate upon so-
called “shatterbelts” – certain potentially combustive, in terms of resources and territory, 
regions – that would lie at the heart of future clashes. Such contested territories were 
epitomized by close proximity to the Soviet Union and later China and, naturally, 
enveloped first and foremost central Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific Rim, etc.  
 The Korean War and the looming threat of Vietnam seemed to have further 
buttressed Cohen’s geographical prospects and lent additional credence to his 
assumptions even if a heated encounter over Cuba in 1962113 clearly saw the extreme 
sensitiveness of an off-shore island mere 145 kilometers south of the USA.114 Such ample 
evidence serves to demonstrate that despite the tremendous erosion of the science of 
geopolitics in the wake of its demonized association with Nazi Germany, Truman’s 
containment policy framing the post-WWII discourse late into the 1960s must be 
understood, in the words of Dittmer: “as anything but applied political geography.”115 
 Yet intriguingly enough, as the West endeavoured to project its supposedly 
original (geo)political gaze upon the Rest while purposefully avoiding employing the 
actual term in the first place, we can unravel another swath of a complex geopolitical 
mosaic, which somehow contradicts the mainstream obfuscation of geopolitics: Germany 
kept publishing Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (1951 – 1968), the U.S. Air Force produced a 
publication titled Military Aspects of World Political Geography (1958) and Mahan’s as 
well as Mackinder’s mostly pre-war postulations found fertile soil in Latin America 
                                               
111 His pioneering work titled Geography and Politics in a Divided World (1963). Saul Bernard Cohen, 
Geography and Politics in a Divided World (Massachussets: Methuen, 1963). 
112 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction , 27 – 28. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very 
Short Introduction, 35 – 36. 
113 For an apt parallel with the US-Spanish War in 1898 framed by the exact same island, see: Robert 
Kagan, Nebezpečný národ (2008). 
114 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 37. 
115 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 8. 
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exemplified by Brazilian geopolitician Golbery116 who fiercely advocated exclusive 
Brazilian leadership in South America, favoured allying his country with the USA to 
protect Brazil’s maritime interests and actively influenced Brazilian foreign policy as 
America and Europe almost unanimously deemphasized the importance of geopolitics.117  
As Kagan aptly remarked in his latest book: “Even after WWII most Americans never 
intended to become a global leading power.”118  
 Yet ever since America reluctantly accepted its great power status amplified by a 
grudging concordance with the establishment of the NATO alliance and began laying the 
foundations and setting the solid cornerstones of the present liberal economic order, we 
can clearly witness that the foreseeable future of international order became irreversibly 
intertwined with those who wished to pull back across the ocean even in the late 1940s.119 
However, it took more than two turbulent decades abounding with global small-scale 
clashes within the Cold War framework for the science of geopolitics to become a 
hesitant subject of serious academic study once again. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary 
of State, is often credited with the geopolitical revival and renewed interest in the USA.120 
Notwithstanding his somehow vague and distorted usage of the term, Kissinger, a German 
émigré and an intellectual heavyweight in the Nixon administration, employed geopolitics 
to highlight the paramount importance of global equilibrium and a balance of power to 
promote a significantly more flexible as well as attentive approach to new reality 
characterized by the Sino-Soviet split, which he sought to fully utilize to America’s 
advantage.  
 Accompanied by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s Polish-born National 
Security Adviser, we are able to recognize the very initial strands of America’s 
neoconservative tradition, the pivotal aim of which origins lay in shaping political and 
military developments through a traditionally imperial geopolitical gaze and protecting 
America’s national interests in the turbulent 1980s.121 However, such a reincarnation of 
geopolitics framed by the bipolar context of the Cold War, was strongly denounced by a 
                                               
116 Golbery do Couto Silva, Geopolitics of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1967). 
117 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 8, 13. 
118 Robert Kagan, The World America Made, 18. 
119 Robert Kagan, The World America Made, 19 – 20. 
120 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 39 – 40. 
121 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 39 – 41. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, 
Geopolitics and Identity, 8 – 9. Historically speaking, this sometimes meant supporting countless military 
regimes, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Afghanistan being arguably the shiniest examples, in order to counter 
and contain Soviets‘ ambitions. Also, as Tuathail mentions, this period saw a convenient justification of 
America’s particularly aggresive nuclear and war-fighting doctrines by referring to the almost forgotten 
texts of Spykman and Mackinder. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 56. 
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radical French geopolitician – Yves Lacoste – who released a challenging study famously 
titled: La Géographie, ça sert d’abord, à faire la guerre (1976), in which he held 
geographical knowledge responsible for basically any major military disputes, hinted at 
its supposedly violent characteristics and advocated a more critical approach toward 
stato-centric and great power politics, which, he argued, had shaped foreign as well as 
domestic policies since time immemorial.122  
 Thus, this paved the way for a widespread re-conceptualization of geopolitics from 
the 1980s onwards and together with a belated incorporation of intellectual currents 
already present elsewhere in social sciences and collectively labeled poststructuralism and 
further reinforced by a baffling range of economic, military, cultural, ideological and 
individual factors emanating from the tumultuous era of the 1970s,123 a subdiscipline 
dubbed critical geopolitics made manifest.  
 
2.3.1 Critical geopolitics – deconstructing everyday perceptions 
First and foremost, critical geopoliticians concern themselves with discourse, itself a 
rather elusive term stemming from Derridean post-structuralism, which Rodolphe Gasché 
defines as a “structure of predicates clustered around one central predicate, [while] the 
determining predicate is itself conditioned by the backdrop of the others.”124 Or as Dodds 
remarked: “Discourses are seen to influence the rules and conventions by which political 
behaviour is structured, regulated and judged. [...] Discourses play a prominent role in 
mobilizing certain simple geographic understandings about the world.”125 Thus, it is 
reasonable to believe that critical geopolitics must be understood as an unbiased approach 
toward geography and the global circumscription of our world, which asserts and 
emphasizes the irreducible textuality of geography as well as geopolitics and seeks to 
position itself as a mere deconstructed geo-political126 eye that analyzes a socially 
constructed geo-political world.  
 Moreover, according to Tuathail, Dalby, Agnew and other leading proponents of 
critical geopolitics, we must abstain from perceiving geopolitical theories as a set of 
                                               
122 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 9. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical 
Introduction, 29.  
123 Such as the rise of third world nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, the abysmal inflexibility of nuclear 
weapons when coping with regional issues, economic changes, oil shocks and overall the need to better 
grasp the new reality of foreign as well as domestic challenges. Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the 
issues, 9. 
124 Rodolphe Gasché, Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida (London: Harvard University Press, 
1994), 128 – 129.  
125 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 31. 
126 Hyphenatable, courtesy of Tuathail et al. 
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permanent, monolithic and never-changing assumptions sheltered by an all-explaining 
grand tale, but rather subject them to intensive critical scrutiny and a major re-
examination in the light of poststructuralism, various competing interpretations of the 
exact same theory, the changing global spectacle and differing implications across 
countries and decades.127 Such complex arguments raised by Tuathail and others who 
succeeded in further elaborating upon what Derrida termed “the logocentrism of Western 
thought” and applied his as well as Foucault’s assumptions to geopolitics, were skillfully 
summarized by Dittmer, who basically postulated that while classical geopolitics rooted 
its (discursive) analyses in “the way world is”, critical geopolitics comes to terms with a 
much more interwoven web of a wide range of features and attempts to comprehend what 
makes us think of the world in a certain way.128 The shifting characteristics of the 
supposed primacy of state in world affairs represent a case in point.  
 Nevertheless, even critical geopoliticians, as Tuathail and Dalby lamented, have 
yet to rigorously conceptualize and theorize the very object they often tend to evoke, 
invoke and deconstruct: geopolitics.129 In any case, expanding our attention beyond the 
state-centric veneer of the geography of politics and incorporating, until recently, heavily 
downplayed socially constructed and especially cultural, just to name a few, aspects of 
geography in general, constitutes a first stepping stone on a long and strenuous, albeit 
historic and unique, geopolitical journey to the 21st century and beyond.130  
 
                                               
127 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 43 – 50, Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical 
Introduction, 31 – 32. 
128 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 10 – 11. 
129 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 48. Simon Dalby, “Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and Critique. 
Twenty Years and counting...” Paper for presentation to the "Critical Geopolitics 2008," conference, 
Durham University, 2008. 
130 A similar case was argued in the field of international security. For more, see: Buzan Barry Buzan and 
Wilde de Jaap and Ole Weaver, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Colorado:Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998).  
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2.3.2 The 1990s – a brief unipolar moment? 
However contingent the supposedly momentous era for the enlargement of liberal 
democracies131 soon proved to be and no matter how disputed Krauthammer’s daring 
claim of a unipolar world under America’s auspices became132 in the light of the 
precipitous recurrence of tribally based conflicts133 in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Rwanda 
and elsewhere, the next two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union have 
undoubtedly witnessed the increasing importance of geography in world affairs. Further 
reinforced by natural disasters, instantaneous communication systems, the rise of the Rest 
and other global phenomena, whose possible developments will be foreshadowed and 
explored in the passing in the concluding part, ushered in yet another heyday for 
geography, its renewed prominence, restored importance and rediscovered interest.134  
 Two prominent geopolitical authors stand out in the tumultuous period of the 
1990s. Edward Luttwak, a Romanian-born defense intellectual, positioned himself as a 
geoeconomic strategist who asserted that the methods of commerce, economic 
interdependence and innovation were gradually replacing archaic military-technical 
advancement. Thus, he believed that newly emerging fault-lines and conflicts would 
occur alongside economic competitiveness in a continuously interconnected world.135 
Driven by the famous Japanese economic miracle in the 1980s,136 Luttwak sought to raise 
consciousness about America’s inevitable loss of world, geopolitical as well as 
geoeconomic, supremacy due to its inefficiency and a redundant neoconservative strategy 
in a post-Cold War environment marked by sharp and uncomfortable deterritorialization. 
However questionable his account of the shifting world stage in the late 20th century 
remains, he must be given credit for brilliantly capturing the grand ambivalence, the 
pressing uncertainty and the fateful crossroads of ominously prophetic significance 
America, and the Rest, stood on137 as Hobsbawn’s “short 20th century”138 drew to its 
sudden close.  
                                               
131 As envisaged by Francis Fukuyama in his much debated masterpiece The End of History and the Last 
Man. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that even Fukuyama warned, to a certain extent, on premature 
celebrations in terms of the alleged triumph of liberal democracies and the third, final wave of 
democratization. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992). 
132 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 1 (1990): 23 – 33.  
133 Not to mention the conducive environment for the emergence of transnational terrorist groups. 
134 Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the issues, 9. 
135 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 183 – 186. 
136 A trend already on a strong decline in the early 1990s followed by an even larger, dimmer aftermath. 
137 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 188 – 189. 
138 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, The short twentieth century 1914 – 1991 (London: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1995). 
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2.3.3 Samuel Huntington, bellicose civilizations and the 9/11 vertigo 
The Clash of Civilizations represents another heavily influential geopolitical paradigm, 
condemned and trashed by the academic community since its release,139 yet heavily 
influential in the wake of 9/11. Nevertheless, we need to realize that Huntington is best 
described as an intellectual of statecraft who wrote on a myriad of topics ranging from the 
social and political upheavals of the swinging 60s (The Crisis of Democracy)140, over 
Japan’s allegedly unstoppable bid for economic mastery and its emergent threat to 
America’s primacy in world affairs, to broad civilizational patterns and lucid maps of the 
post-Cold War era.141 Such overarching ambitions, simplifying conciseness and messianic 
prophecies were bound and almost destined to attract attention across various 
intellectuals, public as well as media. While boldly enframing human history with 
civilizational blocs that used to clash along ancient fault-lines and intend to do so again, 
Huntington’s geopolitical spectacle featuring perhaps eight major world civilizations142 
offered a simplistic and intelligible, however empirically implausible, guide to past as 
well as future conflicts.  
 Yet precisely because of the deterministic totality of Huntington’s concept of 
civilization vaguely defined as: “the broadest cultural entity. [...]The highest cultural 
grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that 
which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective 
elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective 
self-identification of people.”143 he succeeded in, similarly to Mackinder, projecting a 
deeply modernist view embedded in traditional geopolitics and a more sober assessment, 
as Fukuyama’s moderately optimistic vision and Bush’s “New World Order” were slowly 
waning off, to analyze an unfolding post-modern world. This allows us to draw very apt 
parallels between Mackinder’s struggle against the loss of credibility of imperial 
geopolitics as, among other contributing factors, the fin-de-siècle movement and 
                                               
139 First as an article in Foreign Affairs in 1993 and three years later as a book-long thesis titled 
eponymously. 
140 Samuel P. Huntington and Michel Crozier and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the 
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 
1975).  
141 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 190 – 192. Ervand Abrahamian, “The US media. Huntington 
and September 11.” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2003): 529 – 530. 
142 Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African. 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Sydney: Simon & 
Schuster, 1997), 26 – 27. See the appendices. 
143 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 39. 
  
                                                                                                                                              
  
 
 27 
 
modernists threatened to undermine its trustworthiness at the dawn of the 19th century and 
Huntington’s ambitious attempt to address the still rather enigmatic post-Cold War 
period, the historic absence of a clearly defined threat to America and the emerging 
strands of critical theories, which subjected traditional geopolitics and other fields to 
intense scrutiny and reevaluations.144  
 Before moving on to popular geopolitics, let us at least briefly explore some of the 
key assumptions Huntington’s ostensibly ground-breaking thesis introduced: 1) 
ahistoricity, monolithicity and impenetrability of civilizational blocks, 2) transitional 
territories and civilizational fault lines that would lie at the heart of future conflicts, 3) the 
supposedly inherent bellicosity of Islamic civilization prompting it on a collision path 
with the West, 4) the fear of a Sino-Islamic alliance.145 Despite the almost unanimous 
denigration by and disapproval of146 the academic community, Huntington succeeded 
where others failed – his somehow incoherent and subpar thesis became conventional 
wisdom and the leading paradigm in the wake of 9/11 mostly due to its comprehensible 
explanations especially among the public, downright simplified solutions and prophetic 
characteristics that dovetailed very well with the American media, the public as well as 
politicians who were looking for an easy scapegoat with which to frame the infamous 
terrorist attack that exposed America’s internal vulnerability and shattered the delusional 
world Americans had been long intoxicating themselves by.147  
 Yet most of all, Huntington achieved the seemingly impossible – his forte lay in 
the far-reaching ability to explain and predict international politics without actually 
debating it.148 When 9/11 brought upon the War on Terrorism, American public as well as 
the administration of George W. Bush hastily subscribed to it and cringingly embraced 
the overly superficial Huntingtonian neoconservative paradigm.149  
2.3.4 Into the 21st century and beyond 
                                               
144 As much as the author does not endeavour to engage in examining the similarities between the British 
Empire and present-day America, it would seem that certain shared aspects have indeed made manifest. 
145 Dietrich Senghaas, “Clash of Civilizations, An Ideé Fixé?” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 1 (1998): 
127 – 132. Ervand Abrahamian, “The US media. Huntington and September 11,” Third World Quarterly 24, 
no. 3 (2003): 529 – 533. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, 209 – 218. 
146 E.g. Edward Said, “The Myth of the ‘Clash of Civilizations,” Lecture at University of Massachusetts-
Amherst, 2005. Dietrich Senghaas, “Clash of Civilizations, An Ideé Fixé?” 127 – 132. Ervand Abrahamian, 
“The US media. Huntington and September 11,” 529 – 544. 
147 Ervand Abrahamian, “The US media. Huntington and September 11,” 530 – 531. 
148 Ervand Abrahamian, “The US media. Huntington and September 11,” 535. 
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With critical as well as traditional geopolitics entering a new stage, its critical “branch” 
gaining more prominence and clashing with the proponents of traditional geopolitics, 
Donna Haraway comes to mind as a significant feminist scholar, although somewhat 
criticized as of late, who advocated the crucial importance of the actual representation of 
geopolitics to particular audiences and the messages about global spatialization it 
conveys.150 Furthermore, global geopolitics, as envisaged by critical geopoliticians, 
remains strongly entangled with the issues of gender, class, race and needs to adapt to 
fundamentally different and shockingly contrastive geopolitical experiences of individuals 
across the globe that cannot be explained nor understood by a single grand geopolitical 
tale.151  
 Thus, in order to better comprehend how geopolitics is supposed to work in the 
21st century, Tuathail and other scholars proposed a threefold division of the 
aforementioned field into: a) formal geopolitics encompassing think-tanks and academics 
while paying tribute to the classical geopolitical thinking, b) practical geopolitics 
sheltering the discourse employed by politicians, policy makers152 and political 
institutions and c) popular geopolitics which involves the study of the media in virtually 
all its forms, refers to the everyday geopolitical discourse and analyzes how the global 
geopolitical framework is simplified, sometimes intentionally distorted, and presented to 
its eager audiences through the various forms of media.153 It is now the third branch of 
geopolitics to which we turn our attention.154 
 
 
 
                                               
150 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 44 – 45. Donna Haraway, Primate Visions 
(London: Routledge), 1989.  
151 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 46. 
152 Such as George W. Bush and his policy-orientated geographical templates of War on Terrorism. 
153 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 50. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction, 45 – 
46. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 13 – 15. See the appendices. 
154 For a skillful analysis of the current “clash of geopolitics,” the author cordially recommends a concise 
article written by Jan Kofroň, “Geopolitika na pomezí geografie a mezinárodních vztahů mezi prostorem 
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 29 
 
3 POPULAR GEOPOLITICS 
Concerned mostly with geopolitical representation, shifting discourses, constructed 
identities and power relations, the overarching theme of popular geopolitics has been a 
challenging recognition of geopolitics as an everyday discursive practice that occurs 
outside of practical as well as formal geopolitics. Thanks to Dalby, Agnew and Tuathail, 
those critical intellectuals who ventured beyond the superficial veneer of the hegemonic 
geopolitical gaze of traditional geopolitics in the 1980s, vigorously combated against the 
perceived reductionism of classical geopolitical theories and in doing so opened up the 
entire discipline to large-scale re-examinations, we may fathom popular geopolitics as a 
daring attempt to alter the focus of geopolitics toward audiences and mediated 
interpretations of various events through culturally as well as politically embedded prisms 
congealed with national identities.155 Such a broadly defined concept indeed borders on a 
plethora of other closely related fields – ranging from cultural studies, over feminist 
geopolitics, to audience studies – however, as Sharp incisively contended, popular 
geopolitics seeks to contextualize and empirically interpret elite geopolitical texts same as 
their popular counterparts via e.g. news, comic books, magazines, movies, music, 
videogames etc.156  
 While examining only the former, it renders audiences downright apolitical and 
passive  – as mere consumers – unable to engage in the ubiquitous process of constructing 
geopolitical imaginations, yet should we concentrate solely upon the latter, it would 
inextricably downplay wider contextualization and oftentimes political enframement and 
narratives trickling down from influential decision-makers and those powerful enough to 
bend geopolitical reality to their will through the dissemination of hegemonic ideologies. 
Thus, such entangled interconnectedness of “elite” and “popular” has been permeating 
much of the popular geopolitics literature ever since the cautious, yet greatly insightful, 
coinage of the actual term in the late 1980s.157 Most definitions of popular culture involve 
                                               
155 Jason Dittmer and Nicholas Gray, “Popular Geopolitics 2.0: Towards New Methodologies of the 
Everyday,” Geography Compass 11, no. 4 (2010): 1664 – 1666. Joanne P. Sharp, “Publishing American 
identity: popular geopolitics, myth and the Reader’s Digest,” Political Geography 12, no. 6 (1993): 491 – 
493. Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction 
of danger,” Political Geography 15, no. 6/7 (1996): 558 – 559. 
156 Joanne P. Sharp, “Publishing American identity: popular geopolitics, myth and the Reader’s Digest,” 
493. Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction 
of danger,” 559. Jason Dittmer and Nicholas Gray, Popular Geopolitics 2.0: Towards New Methodologies 
of the Everyday,” 1666. 
157 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 50. Jason Dittmer and Nicholas Gray, “Popular Geopolitics 
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mass consumption and availability together with affordability as crucial variables.158 
What originated as an undesirable side effect of the invention of the printing press in the 
1400s was soon conceived of as a dire threat to hegemonic, elite religious interpretations. 
Therefore, popular culture is often juxtaposed against high culture, the culture associated 
with elites.159  
 Throughout the span of several centuries popular culture has been almost indelibly 
stained by propaganda, especially in the 20th century, and very simple-minded messages. 
Yet still, according to Dittmer160 the steep emergence of contemporary popular culture 
and its pervasive attempts to cater to young audiences date to the swinging era of the 
1960s, when the increase in disposable income161 among youngsters led in turn to a 
widespread flourishing of mostly Hollywood-based companies dedicated to mass 
consumerism.162 163 Similarly, popular culture has also been characterized through its 
opposition toward folk culture which has traditionally been linked to a particular place, 
monolithic communities and a search for identity and its significance further strengthened 
in a daring attempt to preserve local uniqueness and counter globalization(s).164  
 However, those overly simplified and blatantly misguided assumptions of 
lingering equations positing popular culture on one side and social malaises on the other 
soon enticed the attention of various left-leaning academics and paved the way for the 
emergence of a key institution – the Marxist-inspired Frankfurt School.165 In order not to 
spend too much space navigating through the entangled and complex labyrinth of authors 
associated with the Frankfurt School mired in the complicated theories of cultural 
hegemony, Gramscian postulations and ostensible American imperialism, let us conclude 
that once very sharp and distinctive contours of elite, popular and folk cultures have 
become almost completely blurred in an exceptional congealment that penetrates all three 
categories166 and renders any clear distinction ultimately indefensible.167  
                                               
158 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 23 – 26. Joanne P. Sharp, “Publishing 
American identity: popular geopolitics, myth and the Reader’s Digest,” 559. 
159 Classical music, sculpturing, painting to name a few. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and 
Identity, 23 – 24. 
160 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 24 – 25. 
161 Such as numerous TV shows or espionage thrillers. 
162 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 24. 
163 Emanating from, generally speaking, post-WWII prosperity in North America and Western Europe. 
164 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 24 – 25. 
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 Throughout the last three decades of this surprisingly recent phenomenon, it is 
possible to uncover roughly four central impetuses and working assumptions underwriting 
the emerging literature on popular geopolitics that have been essential for drawing the 
attention of largely skeptical scholars and academics to more thorough methodological 
evaluations of the tremendous potential of the abovementioned pillar of critical 
geopolitics.168 Remarkably, one of the initial impetuses compelling increasingly 
bifurcated geopoliticians to broaden even further the scope of (critical) geopolitics came 
with Ronald Reagan’s unequivocal term “evil empire” in a reference to the Soviet Union 
against the backdrop of the unfolding “Second Cold War” in the 1980s.  
 As Dodds and Dittmer eloquently remarked, this particular term that conveyed a 
rather straightforward message was uttered in the aftermath of several Star Wars movies 
in an increasingly globalized world and indeed, multiple commentators made an explicitly 
vilifying connection between the Soviets and “the dark side” led by Darth Vader.169 Such 
a clear binary division drawing from the arguably most popular cinematic phenomena in 
the early 1980s offered an easy-to-grasp enframement in the turbulent age of increased 
military spending and Ronald Reagan’s own “star wars” project – Strategic Defense 
Initiative.170  
 Another crucial contributing factor impelling (popular) geopoliticians to 
deconstruct hegemonic reconstructions of national identity through popular media was 
manifested in Joanne Sharp’s seminal work on Reader’s Digest and its condensation of 
the Cold War.171 Nevertheless, the historic turning point that impacted basically all 
American-based sources172 of popular culture coincided, unsurprisingly, with terrorist173 
attacks of 9/11.174 Lastly, a recent paper devised by Dittmer and Dodds endeavours to 
                                               
168 See: Agnew (2002), Tuathail (1996), Dalby (2008), Sharp (1993, 1996, 2000), Dittmerr (2008, 2010) and 
Dodds (2006, 2008). 
169 Klaus Dodds and Jason Dittmer, “Popular Geopolitics Past and Future: Fandom, Identities and 
Audiences,” Geopolitics 13, no. 3 (2008): 440 – 441.  
170 Klaus Dodds and Jason Dittmer, “Popular Geopolitics Past and Future: Fandom, Identities and 
Audiences,” 440 – 441. 
171 Her illuminating book Reader’s Digest, Condensing the Cold War as well as various papers will be 
analyzed in one of the following case studies. Klaus Dodds and Jason Dittmer, “Popular Geopolitics Past 
and Future: Fandom, Identities and Audiences,” 441. 
172 As well as a wide range of non-Western mass media and their altered geopolitical perceptions in the 
wake of 9/11. 
173 For the purposes of this bachelor’s thesis we will be using this highly controversial term only when 
absolutely necessary. 
174 Which, again, will be examined more thoroughly in subsequent chapters. See: Jason Dittmer, Popular 
Culture, Geopolitics and Identity. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction or Timothy 
Garton Ash, Free World (London: Penguin Books, 2004). 
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evaluate thirty years of popular geopolitics within critical geopolitics, hint at its 
limitations and challenges and propose a future course.175  
 Nevertheless, the author of this thesis is convinced that the importance of the 
precipitous development of informational technologies from 1970s onwards 
interconnected with globalization must not be underestimated either and hence constitutes 
a fifth critical impetus. Before moving on to individual case studies, it is worth bringing 
up Dodds’ four succinct assumptions that will interpenetrate the vast majority of 
examples across the field of popular geopolitics: a) agenda setting – highlighting the 
importance of certain events at the expense of others,176 b) enframement – contributing to 
particular narrative structures and allusions to past mischance,177 c) the commonsense 
stereotyping of others – articulating and reproducing national identities178 and d) 
multiplicity of interpretations of media material – catering to Foucaltian and Derridean 
assumptions on every individual viewer inside a country as well as across civilizations 
being a unique interpretative instrument in the construction of his/her own (geopolitical) 
imaginations.179 
 
3.1 Captain America – how to crush America’s enemies in self-defense 
Born amidst the early military encounters of the war-torn European theatre as the old 
continent clashed for the second time in mere two decades, the origins of Captain 
America, a jingoistic wartime crusader against Nazi Germany and imperial Japan are 
inseparably connected with Joe Simon and Jack Kirby. Bringing to life Steve Rodgers,180 
a physically impaired recruit with a just heart who voluntarily undergoes a medical 
experiment that transforms him into the ultimate soldier and locating him in an America 
that rives with Nazi espionage and subversion may be viewed as a consequence of the 
overwhelming preponderance of Jewish-American authors in the comic book industry 
                                               
175 Jason Dittmer and Klaus Dodds, “Popular Geopolitics Past and Future: Fandom, Identities and 
Audiences.” 
176 A case in point when it came to the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s, which received 
much more mainstream coverage than e.g. humanitarian malaises in Sudan or Khasmir. Klaus Dodds, 
Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 75. 
177 Such as “Vietnam 2.0” in the case of a prolonged invasion of Iraq with somewhat similarly meager 
results or the emotionally imbued terms – “holocaust” and “quagmire” employed by the British print media 
when depicting the Yugoslav Crisis in the 1990s. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 
75. 
178 Albeit being sometimes contested and more complicated, the Cold War world of cinematography 
provides myriad demonstrations of American movies reinforcing a one-dimensional image of the Soviet 
Union as “the Evil Other”. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 75. 
179 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 75. 
180 A blond-haired, blue-eyed character with an extremely generic American name. 
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who were intent on pushing America beyond its reluctant assistance in WWII.181 Also, it 
deftly hints at the limits of traditional geopolitical theories, which failed to address and 
grasp this subtle Nazi “cunning deviousness.” 
 Moreover, because of the tremendous success of a future rival company DC 
Comics and its Superman comic books182 in 1938, others sought to imitate a similar 
formula in hopes of becoming at least moderately successful.183 Thus, in March 1941, the 
first issue of Captain America, exhibiting this star-spangled hero punching Hitler in the 
jaw on the cover was released almost ten months (!) prior to America’s official entry to 
WWII.184 Such an overt political statement masterfully tapped into the slowly vanishing 
and subsiding isolationism in the national consciousness. The first issue sold over one 
million copies and impacted American pre-war sentiment beyond reckoning.185  
 When we attempt to deconstruct the Captain as both an incredibly powerful 
symbol of and for America, it remains noteworthy that the creators excelled at combining 
the expressive power of comic books and capacity to provoke a swath of reactions 
ranging from laughter and amusement to offense and violence.186 Unmistakably identified 
as a territorial symbol by his red, white and blue star-spangled uniform, Captain America 
remains a part of what Renan called the “cult of the flag”187 – his outfit being oftentimes 
mocked by foes yet never ridiculed by allies. Additionally, Stan Lee, a comic book 
legend, argued that the Captain represented “the best aspects of America: courage and 
honesty.”188  
                                               
181 Jason Dittmer,“America is safe while its boys and girls believe in its creeds! Captain America and 
American identity prior to World War 2,” Environment and Planning Development: Society and Space 25 
(2007): 408 – 409, Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 80 – 81.  
182 Which boasted a monthly circulation of more than 1 million copies.182 Jason Dittmer,“America is safe 
while its boys and girls believe in its creeds! Captain America and American identity prior to World War 
2,” 410. 
183 Jason Dittmer,“America is safe while its boys and girls believe in its creeds! Captain America and 
American identity prior to World War 2,” 406. 
184 Jason Dittmer,“America is safe while its boys and girls believe in its creeds! Captain America and 
American identity prior to World War 2,” 407, Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 80 
– 81. Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95, no. 3 (2005): 626 – 643. 
185 Jason Dittmer,“America is safe while its boys and girls believe in its creeds! Captain America and 
American identity prior to World War 2,” 407. 
186 For more, see: Klaus Dodds, “Popular Geopolitics and Cartoons: Representing Power Relations, 
Repetition and Resistance,” Critical African Studies 4 (2010): 1 – 19. 
187 Ernest Renan, “What is a nation?” In: Nation and narration, ed. H. Bhabha, 17 (London: Routledge). 
188 Cited in: Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-
9/11 Geopolitics,” 629. At this point the author of this thesis would like to add two additional 
characteristics: innocence and defensive inclinations – much like the US Department of Defense – formerly 
known as the Department of War. Adapted from: Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 
81. 
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 Yet most of all, as Dittmer remarks: “Captain America contributes to the 
American geopolitical narrative by being ultimately defensive in nature.”189 He is 
endowed with a unique weapon indicative of his (and America’s) defensiveness: a shield. 
While he has become quite skilled at throwing his star-spangled shield as an offensive 
weapon at various enemies, this defensive rather than offensive narrative bears crucial 
importance for America’s own identity. In comparison to e.g. Superman – the ultimate 
American immigrant who blends in and assimilates relatively easily – Captain America is 
not an entirely fantasy figure – he certainly remains strong enough to win every battle, yet 
alone cannot turn the war in his favour.190 Also, teamed up with blatant resemblance 
between Captain’s world and the one the reader lived in, this apparent symmetry of 
narratives made his excitingly violent adventures all the more enjoyable.191  
 Yet when World War II ended, interest in these kinds of jingoistic tales waned 
substantially. Without Germans or Japanese to perilously fight, such a nationalist figure 
seemed out of place and somehow purposeless. Several attempts were made to resurrect 
the Captain and maintain his audience – Captain America’s Weird Tales inspired by 
horror stories and crime-related scenes and “Captain America...Commie Smasher!” – with 
mixed results at best. The latter is of particular importance to us as it aptly showcases an 
effort to feed on the geopolitical narrative of the unfolding Cold War in a turbulent 
climate of McCarthyism and a fervent hunt for Communist traitors at home.192 However, 
such one-dimensional stories conveying simple messages “that Communists were evil, 
overweight and poor dressers”193 sold very poorly and failed to offer any meaningful 
discussions of Cold War issues to the audience, which gradually lost interest.194  
                                               
189 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 630. J. Simon and J. Kirby, Captain America Comics, no. 1 (New York: Timely Comics, 
1941), 1 – 19. 
190 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 630. J. Simon and J. Kirby, Captain America Comics, no. 2 – 6 (New York: Timely Comics, 
1941). 
191 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 630 – 631. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 81- 83. Jason Dittmer, 
“America is safe while its boys and girls believe in its creeds! Captain America and American identity prior 
to World War 2,” 408 – 410. As Dittmer humorously mentions: “If Superman fought the Nazis, it would be 
a very one-sided affair. The war would be over in a few scant issues of the comic book and then what?” 
Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 83. 
192 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 631- 632. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 83 – 84.  
193 Bradford W. Wright, Comic book nation: The transformation of youth culture in America (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 123. 
194 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 631, Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 85. 
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 After a decade-long pause, the third and still ongoing major incarnation of Captain 
America returned to newsstands in 1964, thanks to Stan Lee who introduced a baffling 
shift – a retroactive change in continuity195 – in order to annul the “Commie Smasher” 
period and adapt to a new America embroiled in the Vietnam War and immersed in the 
civil right movement and gender as well as environmental issues.196 In 1972 this obvious 
contradiction in narrative and hole in continuity was finally addressed – the true Captain 
was supposed to hit an iceberg in 1945 and the US government assumed he died. 
 Nevertheless, thanks to a Nazi version of the super soldier serum,197 the 
government under much pressure decided to make a new Captain, indistinguishable from 
the real one. An ultimate showdown between the two Captains and their contrastive 
philosophies soon occurred with the real hero emerging, of course, victorious.198 Ever 
since the 1970s Captain America continued battling against a plethora of issues relevant 
to the period it was written in – poverty, racism, pollution etc. – which thus rendered him 
dynamism in the face of America’s own fragmented identity.199  
 The events of 9/11 provided a splendid opportunity for the Captain America 
comics to return to their original, clear geopolitical script devoid of complexity and free 
of the ambiguity introduced in the 1960s.200 As Dalby summarizes: “[...]the polarization 
dynamic was set in motion hastily; them and us, freedom versus terror reprised the 
themes of other American Wars, both hot and cold.”201 Circumstantially, the condemnable 
events of 9/11 coincided with the finalizing endeavours to release a new Captain America 
series and thus, it comes as no surprise that several new storylines were hurriedly written 
to incorporate the aforementioned terrorist attack. Staying consistent with the dominant 
                                               
195 A rewriting of what has happened prior. 
196 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 631. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 85. 
197 Whose stainless version turned Steve Rodgers into an ultimate fighter in 1941. 
198 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 632 – 633. Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 86 – 87. Indicative of 
their abysmal differences is the following dialogue: Real Captain America: “You think I’m a traitor? Grow 
up, fella – times have changed! America’s in danger from within as well as without! There’s organized 
crime, injustice, and fascism – or wouldn’t you recognize that?” 1950s Captain America: “Are you calling 
me – a fascist? You mealy-mouthed rat! You’re scared to face up to the commies in a war, like a real man! 
I’m a real man! And I’ll kill you to prove it!” That dialogue escalated rather quickly. Adapted from: Jason 
Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 87. 
199 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 87. 
 
200 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 87. 
201 Simon Dalby, “Calling 911: Geopolitics, security and America's new war,” in: 11 September and its 
aftermath: The geopolitics of terror, edited by S. Brunn, 61 – 86 (London: Frank Cass, 2004). 
66. And as Jean Monnet once famously contended: “If you cannot solve a problem, [simply] enlarge the 
context!“, which echoes well with the Huntington paradigm the administration of George W. Bush sought to 
follow. Quoted in: Timothy Garton Ash, Free World, 183. 
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geopolitical narrative of 9/11 the first twenty-four pages of Captain America #1 display 
Steve Rodgers at the ruined location of Ground Zero and looking for any survivors in the 
rubble.202 For us, it is essential to note that the events were framed as war imposed upon 
an innocent America long indulged in its exceptionalism and relatively immune to 
terrorist attacks prior to 9/11.203  
 The ensuing story arc in issues 2 – 6 is centered upon Islamic jihadists who 
airdropped small landmines into a typically Christian, calm and overwhelmingly white 
city of Centerville204 seven months after 9/11.205 Such an obvious contrast between the 
Christian, tolerant and open Centerville and the “Other” world embodied by Islamic 
terrorists mirrors heavily and massively draws on Huntington’s (in)famous thesis on “the 
clash of civilizations”, which, as we have already mentioned, gained tremendous, 
however misplaced, prominence in the aftermath of 9/11.206 Furthemore, the debates 
about Mackinderian empire and the uneasy role of a hegemon pervade the recent 
storylines as well.  
 Regardless of supposedly incompatible cultures and allegedly innate belligerent 
inclinations of Islam, Captain America proved his dynamism and a remarkable ability to 
raise a critical voice against a hegemonic, mainstream narrative once again. At the end of 
the abovementioned story arc the Captain is left in doubt after a long-winded 
conversation with a nameless villain who offered a scathing critique of an altered 
American foreign policy and convinces the Captain to acknowledge America’s own 
                                               
202 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 637 – 638. J. N. Rieber and J. Cassaday, Captain America no. 1 (New York: Marvel Comics, 
2002), 1 – 37. 
203 Simon Dalby, “Calling 911: Geopolitics, security and America's new war,” 67. However, the earlier 
1993 bomb in the basement of the World Trade Center or the Oklahoma bombing of 1995 somehow 
invalidate this assumption about complete immunity. 
204 A shining example of what Edensor refers to as a “quotidian landscape”, which also served as an 
apparent proxy for the then unfolding War on Terrorism. T. Edensor, National identity, popular culture and 
everyday life (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 50 – 51. 
205 J. N. Rieber and J. Cassaday, Captain America no. 1 (New York: Marvel Comics, 2002), 1 – 37.  
206 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 639. For a more assiduous assessment of Huntington’s blunders and deficiencies, see e.g.: 
Edward Said’s The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations or the author’s own article titled Civilizational Identity 
and Videogames. Edward Said, “The Myth of the ‘Clash of Civilizations,” Lecture at University of 
Massachusetts-Amherst, 2005. Tomáš Hostýnek, “Civilizational Identity and Videogames,” in: A Search for 
Identity, edited by Ivona Mišterová and Eva Skopečková, 183 – 213 (Plzeň: Západočeská Univerzita, 2013). 
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sins.207 Yet understandably, those by no means either legitimize or justify the terrorist 
activities carried out by Captain’s foes.208  
 Still, such a strong, dissident and counterhegemonic narrative that seeks to 
challenge the validity of the dominant geopolitical perception in the post-9/11 era and 
ventures beyond any traditional geopolitical theories stands out as a prime illustration of 
critical as well as popular geopolitics. Furthermore, the latest movies featuring Captain 
America titled: Captain America: The First Avenger (2011), Captain America: The 
Winter Soldier (2014) and even his appearance in the Avengers (2012) blockbuster aptly 
demonstrate the vast majority of our findings and Captain’s ability to adapt to new 
realities as well as challenge them while upholding all the values America proudly stands 
for.209  
 
3.2 Reader’s Digest – Condensing the Cold War 
Joanne P. Sharp and her continued comprehensive analyses of the shifting role of the 
Reader’s Digest and its tremendous significance in constructing and shaping American 
identity throughout the 20th century and beyond has been central to a much wider 
academic recognition of popular geopolitics as a meaningful field of research. Sharp even 
boldly suggests that the Reader’s Digest “might constitute the single most important voice 
in the creation of popular geopolitics in America in the 20th century”210 thanks to its 
phenomenal insights into the constantly evolving heart of American society that 
oftentimes struggled to interpret especially the unclear actions as well as the cloudy 
intentions of the Soviet Union dwelling on Mackinder’s heartland. Thus, in doing so, the 
Reader’s Digest became a major contributing factor to the construction of American 
views of the Cold War through its interpreted selection of convenient articles and stories 
that unmistakably fit in a much larger and particularly dominant narrative of the Soviet 
                                               
207 J. N. Rieber and J. Cassaday, Captain America no. 3 (New York: Marvel Comics, 2002), 1 – 22. 
208 Jason Dittmer, “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 
Geopolitics,” 640 – 641.  
209 Captain America: The First Avenger, directed by Joe Johnston,  movie, 2011. Captain America: The 
Winter Soldier, directed by Anthony and Joseph Russo, movie, 2014. 
For a more down-to-earth, yet humorously satirical, comic books, cartoons or graphic novels that engage in 
(geo)political events, the author suggests Jonathan Shapiro – a South African cartoonist, Steve Bell or Art 
Spiegelmann – Maus (1991) and Joe Sacco – Palestine (1996). 
210 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 2000), 9. 
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Union as the totalitarian, vicious and malicious “them” even more so in the post-WWII 
era.211  
 While producing such comprehensible binary geography in a heated cold war 
world epitomized by simple bipolar logic, the Reader’s Digest, a showcase of 
“conservative, small-town Americanness,”212 now enjoys a monthly circulation of more 
than 30 million copies and is even translated into close to 20 languages.213 What 
originated in 1922 as a humble attempt to distill articles deserving wider readership from 
predominantly regional sources, has, thanks to DeWitt Wallace and Lila Bella Acheson – 
the initial editors-in-chief214 – developed into a reputable, trustworthy and well 
established form of popular media.215 In addition, the actual modest origins of the 
Reader’s Digest must be properly set against the flamboyant backdrop of the roaring 
1920s, which heralded a spiraling rise of consumerism, mass media and marked a 
significant transformation in the production of magazines intertwined with the emerging 
power of the middle class,216 which, in turn, brought about a major shift in focus 
increasingly aimed at and written for middlebrow rather than elite intellectuals.   
 Even though the previously preponderant form of Victorian culture sought to cater 
to mass audience, to a certain extent, as well, its expensiveness practically excluded the 
vast majority of prospective readership and resulted in being unaffordable to them.217 
However, thanks to mostly technological innovation and myriad smaller improvements in 
the railroad network at the dawn of the 20th century that made an overall facilitation of a 
nation-wide reach possible, these newly emerging magazines218 also ventured beyond 
partisan politics219 and gradually emphasized “national” instead of “local.” Despite being 
                                               
211 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 90. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold 
War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 10. 
212 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 14. 
213 The Czech language being one of them. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and 
American Identity, 14. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 90 
214 Who, according to Dodds, leaned toward strong scepticism of the Soviet Union and communist politics 
in general while maintained tremendous influence in the actual condensation of articles. Klaus Dodds, 
Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 90. 
215 Which was featured in positive light even on the Simpsons TV show. Joanne P. Sharp, “Publishing 
American identity: popular geopolitics, myth and the Reader’s Digest,” 495. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing 
the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 15. 
216 From this Sharp derives the term “middle brow appeal” in contrast to elitism. Joanne P. Sharp, 
Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 22. Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, 
popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction of danger,” 560 – 563. 
217 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 22 – 23. 
218 Which were, technically, the only form of medium to reach its audiences on a regular basis at that time.  
219 A turn further reinforced by muckrakers – individuals identified with investigative journalism and 
exposé literature prior to WWI. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War Reader’s Digest and American 
Identity, 23. 
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heavily criticized220 for its shameful display to, the supposed contamination and disgrace  
of the established elite highbrow culture held dear by e.g. Virginia Woolf, our “notorious 
nemesis” of Halford J. Mackinder, no one could actually deny the dynamic appeal of this 
enticing conjuncture of passionate self-improvement and visionary eagerness of 
middlebrow culture.221  
 It is thus in the hedonistic era of the 1920s that the abovementioned factors made 
manifest, fully blossomed, reverberated through basically all aspects of everyday life and, 
importantly for us, coincided with the establishment of the Reader’s Digest as a future 
dominant narration which engaged in the process of mostly reproducing, reinforcing and 
at times even challenging “common sense”, conventional wisdom and national 
(geo)political culture.222 Sharp, a British geographer, further highlights two essential 
attributes of the Reader’s Digest: a) its emphasis on interpreted articles, arguably written 
by experts in their respective fields, and already processed, filtered and, most of all, 
condensed223 pieces of information so as to present the keen, albeit passive, reader with 
the ready-made complex knowledge of and insights into the latest development around 
the world as well as at home, b) the incorporation of articles on international events next 
to domestic issues of great importance to individual Americans.224 It is hence precisely 
this unique linkage of the everyday to the international explained through the prism of 
American culture225 that makes the Reader’s Digest so appealing and its in-depth analysis 
so enriching.  
                                               
220 Find source! 
221 That set an indispensable cornestone for the second wave of mass consumerism and popular culture 
several decades later as the unchained 1960s were in full swing. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War 
Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 24 – 29. Forlorn by the proliferation of mass consumption and 
broader, more popular interpretations of once a strictly elitist privilege, Virginia Woolf famously asked: 
“How dare the middle-brows teach you how to read – Shakespeare for instance? All you have to do is read 
him.” Cited in: Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 29.  
222 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 24 – 29. Joanne P. 
Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction of danger,” 
559. Additional examples of the interwar populizers of knowledge include: H. G. Wells: Outline of History, 
H. W. Van Loon: Story of Mankind or Will Durant: The Story of Philosophy. Common to all those literary 
pieces is to deliver prescient, almost academic information to a general public while maintaining readability 
and simplicity. Herbert George Wells, The Outline of History (Manchester: Newnes, 1920). Hendrik Willem 
Van Loon, Story of Mankind (Massachussets: H. Liveright, 1921). Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1924). 
 Contemporary populizers in the field of international relations comprise e.g. Niall Fergusson or the author’s 
favourite Timothy Garton Ash. Going by this logic, even Alfred Mahan or Samuel Huntington could 
theoretically belong to this category. 
223 Digested. 
224 Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction 
of danger,” 559. 
225 Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction 
of danger,” 559. Furthermore, Sharp contends that the rhetorical strategies and titles employed by the 
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 The entire interwar period was characterized by grave uncertainty concerning the 
future direction of the international system as Britain was slowly losing its global 
preeminence and America was reluctantly entering the spotlight. Exacerbated by the 1929 
economic crisis and the ostensibly functional practice of socialism and communism in the 
Soviet Union which appeared unscathed in the aftermath of the Black Friday, Reader’s 
Digest articles naturally reflected these ambiguities and competing projects as America 
and the USSR both endeavoured to reassert their own superior economic visions.226  
 Even though the Reader’s Digest seemed to be quite concerned about the surging 
American materialism, crisis in identity and the unforeseeable prospects of the New Deal 
Policy in the wake of 1929 and occasionally even sympathetic to the goals of the Soviet 
Union mirroring America’s own “universalist-progressivist”227 paradigm,228 from the 
1930s onwards we can witness a steady stream of critical articles on the Soviet Union in 
the light of the shocking exposure of its brutal practices, crushing repressions and strong 
authoritarian inclinations, which earned Stalin an infamously honourable pedestal next to 
Hitler and Mussolini.229 While invoking morality and the messianic rhetoric of Manifest 
Destiny, we can thus conclude that on the eve of WWII the Reader’s Digest inscribed the 
Soviet Union as an external geopolitical threat with condemnable practices and nefarious 
intentions that through its gluttonous expansiveness strove to crawl into the heart of 
America.230 
                                                                                                                                            
Reader’s Digest represent a prime example of manipulating and bending the hermeneutics of reception to its 
will, such as: “What is being planned for you?” or “We must face the facts about Russia.” Joanne P. Sharp, 
“Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction of danger,” 559. M. 
Eastman, “To Collaborate successfully – we must face the facts about Russia,” Reader’s Digest 21, no. 6 
(1943): 1 – 14. R. Robey, What is being planned for you? Reader’s Digest 23, no. 2 (1945): 21 – 22. 
226 Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction 
of danger,” 562 – 563. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 
chapter “Ambivalent Geography: Writing World Orders, 1922 – 1945,” 76 – 104.  
227 Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction 
of danger,” 565. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 76 – 
104.  
228 W. Chamberlain, “Russia bows to human nature,” Reader’s Digest 12, no. 11 (1934): 75. 
229 Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction 
of danger,” 565. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction,  91. Also, in 1938 the Reader’s 
Digest saw the launch of a Spanish version for sale in Latin America, which was a mere decade later 
accompanied by an Italian version to counter the Popular Front of Communists and Socialists and its 
scramble for power. This led many to believe that the Reader’s Digest was unscrupulous government 
propaganda connected to the CIA. Yet such fierce accusations are largely exaggerated – despite informally 
collaborating with the American government on several occasions, the Reader’s Digest has throughout its 
history been often highly critical of government administrations regardless of their elephant or donkey 
political proclivities. Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity,  
41 – 42. 
230 G. Sokolsky, “It Can Happen Here,“ Reader’s Digest 15 (1937): 30. Joanne P. Sharp, “Hegemony, 
popular culture and geopolitics: the Reader’s Digest and the construction of danger,” 566. Joanne P. Sharp, 
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 Such a despicable perception of the Soviet Union, one might say, prevailed 
basically until the Vietnam War and the policy of détente without the introduction of any 
radically new representations of the Soviet Union.231 In 1964, however, with US-USSR 
arms talks and further following the rapprochement between the USA and Soviets and 
between America and China under a new economically reformist leadership, this 
deescalating era orchestrated by Richard Nixon and, as we have already postulated, Henry 
Kissinger, saw a gradual decrease in the once astronomical number of articles on the 
Soviet Union. Instead, the Digest thoroughly explored phantom menaces from within 
veiled in the concealed form of the anti-Vietnam War movement, urban violence and civil 
rights movements.232 In spite of such a radical shift of primary concern the Digest still 
remained highly skeptical about the Soviet goodwill to negotiate and resolve conflicting 
issues via peaceful methods.  
 To better demonstrate this apparent disbelief and precarious doubtfulness 
concerning the true intentions of the Soviets in their land-locked heartland, it is worth 
noting that even Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a praised dissident writer, described the policy 
of détente and negotiations as a “conscious Soviet ploy” and a “sly linguistic turn”233 as 
late as 1975. Also, at that time only a handful of authors were convinced that the Soviet 
ideology, even with such an ostensible surface change for better, would allow for peaceful 
coexistence with America’s transcendental and superior morality.234  
 The turbulent period often labeled “The Second Cold War” lasting roughly 
between 1979 – 1990 marked a welcome return to the initial Cold War rhetoric abounding 
with an intensifying geopolitical clash of two global superpowers which both stood for 
and championed completely incompatible economic as well as moral paradigms. 
Furthermore, Soviet inhabitants were, generally speaking, conceived of as subservient to 
the contingent whimsies of the authoritarian state bureaucracy.235 Thus, in the heated era 
                                                                                                                                            
Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 76 – 104. Joanne P. Sharp, “Publishing 
American identity: popular geopolitics, myth and the Reader’s Digest,” 496. 
231 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, chapter “The 
Beginnings of Cold War,” 104 – 128.  
232 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, chapter “The 
Beginnings of Cold War,” 130. 
233 “[When] Khrushchev came here and shouted “We will bury you!” people didn’t believe that . . . they 
took it as a joke. Now, of course, the communists in our country have become more clever. They no longer 
say “We’re going to bury you.” Now they say “détente.” But nothing has changed.” Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn, “Wake Up! Wake Up!” Reader’s Digest 53, no. 12 (1975): 72. 
234 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, chapter “The 
Beginnings of Cold War,” 131. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 92. 
235 Even George Orwell was celebrated as a visionary prophet on the pages of the Reader’s Digest who 
envisioned what the Soviet system would look like amplified ad absurdum. 
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prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Reader’s Digest employed a very 
belligerent rhetoric, denounced Mikhail Gorbachev’s reformist government and sought to 
tap into American identity by, sometimes even artificially, feasting on the existential 
threat communism posed so as to present Americans ill-equipped with geographical 
knowledge a wider understanding and contextualization of the said issues.236  
 Yet with the largely unexpected demise of the economically increasingly 
cumbersome, weary and internally dysfunctional Soviet Union, even the Reader’s Digest 
had to cope with this sudden loss of its cold war alter ego as America stood on a 
momentous crossroad with multiple possible directions – unipolarity, “the end of history” 
and soon-to-be contended “the clash of civilizations.” That the Reader’s Digest chose to 
subscribe to the indomitable role of global American leadership does by no means come 
across as a major paradigmatic turn.237 However, it remains important to note that due to 
the constant search for an existential threat imperiling American identity and its 
praiseworthy values,238 the Digest opted to warn its readers on external as well as internal 
dangers ranging from the Japanese economic miracle239 and the consequent decline of 
America’s global competitiveness, over domestic terrorism manifested in the 1995 
Oklahoma bombing by far-right fanatics,240 to Islamic fundamentalism in e.g. Iran and 
Libya.241 The 9/11 terrorist attack marked another turning point to heightened emphasis 
on domestic insecurity,242 which appears to be the prevalent prismatic scope in the 
unfolding 21st century.243  
 
3.3 James Bond and his early Cold War cinematic ventures 
                                               
236 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identity, 151 – 155, Joanne 
P. Sharp, “Publishing American identity: popular geopolitics, myth and the Reader’s Digest,” 500 – 502. 
Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 92. 
237 Several illuminating articles titled: “Countdown to the Twenty-First Century: Freedom on the March” 
or “Democracy Is Winning” serve as a suitable demonstration of Reader’s Digest geopolitical inclinations in 
a precarious period characterized by America’s own future uncertainty. “Countdown to the 21st Century: 
Freedom on the March,” Reader’s Digest 68, no. 1 (1990): 34 – 45. “Democracy is winning,” Reader’s 
Digest 68, no. 1 (1990). 
238 Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, Reader’s Digest and American Identityy 160 – 161. 
239 Which, by then, was arguably well past beyond its original heyday in the early 1980s. 
240 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 92. 
241 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 92. 
242 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 92. 
243 To acquire a few additional fragments of an explicit literary connection between 9/11 and the Reader’s 
Digest, the author sugeests the following articles: “Remembering September 11: How America Has 
Changed,” Reader’s Digest, last modified September 11, 2011, http://www.rd.com/true-
stories/inspiring/remembering-september-11-america-changed/6/ and Beth Dreher, “9/11: One Remarkable 
Story Out of Many,” Reader’s Digest, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.rd.com/recommends/911-one-
remarkable-story-out-of-many/.  
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Ever since the invention of celluloid paved the way for the emergence of moving pictures, 
the film industries and the overwhelming popularity of movies around the globe surged 
tremendously. Yet precisely because of their ability to offer mass entertainment and to 
appeal to broad audiences, governments and their respective militaries soon recognized 
this rare opportunity to project into and imbue movies with various social, political, moral 
and cultural messages in hopes of tapping into eager viewers and imparting them with a 
particular (geo)political narrative.244  
 As Davies and Wells aptly concluded: “The fact remains, though, that the politics 
of the most powerful nation in the world [the USA] cannot be divorced from the most far-
reaching entertainment medium in the world.”245 Dodds goes even as far as to suggest 
that in America, wars tend to be fought on two fronts: on the actual battlefield and on 
celluloid.246 Throughout the 20th century it is indeed possible to uncover countless 
examples of the American government collaborating with Hollywood studios – ranging 
from financial subsidies, over impartial advice, to leasing real troops and cutting-edge 
military equipment. The Battle Cry of Peace247 (1915), Victory through Air Power248 
(1942) or Air Force249 (1943) serve as cases in point demonstrating the loci of effort the 
American government invested into constructing specific, mostly war-related, identities.  
 Unsurprisingly, even Soviet cinematography flourished under Joseph Stalin, who 
perceived it as an incredibly powerful propaganda tool worth thoroughly perusing, and, to 
a certain extent, abusing. To bolster national self-confidence and prove the indomitable 
spirit of Soviet citizens when facing ostensibly insurmountable obstacles and 
unfavourable odds, the Soviet government strove to sponsor many cinematic projects, 
such as October (1927), Court of Honor (1940) or the two-part historical epic Ivan the 
                                               
244 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 77. 
245 P. Davies and P. Wells, American Films and Politics from Reagan to Bush Jnr.  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), 5. 
246 Klaus Dodds Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 77. 
247 A touching movie exposing the fragility of America’s armed forces on the onset of WWI, which is 
believed to have contributed, among a plethora of other factors, to Woodrow Wilson’s decision to lend a 
hand on bloody European battlefields two years later. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical 
Introduction, 78. 
248 A possible reference to the future significance of aviation as advocated by e.g. A. de Seversky who even 
made an apperance in this movie. Victory through Air Power, directed by Perce Pearce, 1943, Walt Disney 
Studios, Cinema. 
249 A heroic movie reassuring Americans that their country had what it took to fend off and triumph over the 
Japanese war machine which shattered many an American dream about supposed invulnerability concerning 
the shocking aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Also, intriguingly enough, the ending showed American air force 
emerging victorious over Japan two years before the bellicose land of the rising sun admitted defeat. Klaus 
Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 78.  
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Terrible (1944 and 1958).250 Akin to the Soviet Union, the unequivocal marriage between 
Hitler’s Germany and propagandist filmmakers yielded similar pictures imbued with 
propaganda in the late 1930s.251 
 Even the slightly altered silver screen adaptation of Orwell’s Animal Farm (1954) 
secretly endorsed by the CIA under the auspices of the Eisenhower administration252 
illustrates the reciprocal interconnectedness between the government and the filmmakers. 
Despite the original book ending on a rather dim note, the embellished movie version 
displayed animals overthrowing increasingly corrupted Napoleon and his dogs and 
instilling democracy. Such a drastically changed conclusion is indeed to be 
contextualized, according to Dodds,253 as a vigorous attempt to undermine the legitimacy 
of the Soviet Union and hint at its fated vulnerability to organized rebellions.254   
 However, in the 1960s the once almost harmonic relationship between Pentagon 
and Hollywood considerably deteriorated in the light of, most notably, the “Vietnam 
Syndrome” and the civil rights movement,255 which effectively eroded dominant 
geopolitical narratives at that time. It is thus in this turbulent period that the exciting 
cinematic adventures of James Bond made manifest for the first time. When Dr. No hit 
the theaters in 1962 amidst an uneasy era retrospectively called “Hollywood’s Sixties 
recession”256 in a country where Fleming’s novels met with a general lack of interest and 
further exacerbated by ambiguous audience response mixing curiosity and skepticism, the 
consequent phenomenal success and impact of Britain’s premier spy came as a welcome 
stimulus for Hollywood’s own stalemate.257 This unexpected boom of the Bond 
phenomenon encouraged a myriad of other filmmakers to mimic the famous and 
supposedly foolproof Bond formula – espionage, madmen endeavouring to devour the 
world, exotic locations, glamorous females and femme fatales, the latest gadgets, car 
chases and climactic explosions.258 259  
                                               
250 October, Directed by Grigori Aleksandrov and Sergei Eisenstein, 1927, Cinema. Court of Honor, 
Directed by Abram Room, 1940, Cinema. Ivan the Terrible, Directed by Sergei Eisenstein, 1944 and 1958, 
Cinema. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 78. 
251 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 78. 
252 Which saw America embroiled in a domestic hunt for Communist collaborators and preoccupied with 
identifying subversive elements in Hollywood. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 
78. 
253 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 79. 
254 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 79. 
255 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 79. 
256 And also during escalating Cold War encounters over Cuba. 
257 Drew Moniot, “James Bond and America in the Sixties: An Investigation of the Formula Film in Popular 
Culture,” Journal of University Film Association 28, no. 3 (1976): 25.  
258 Drew Moniot, “James Bond and America in the Sixties: An Investigation of the Formula Film in Popular 
Culture,” 25 – 26. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 84. The author’s favourite 
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 Nevertheless, even when the Bond imitations cropped up quite rapidly, these 
usually meager impersonations could never arouse so much popularity. Thus, when we 
attempt to more assiduously deconstruct what lies behind the extraordinary success of 
Bond’s exciting escapades, Dodds’ abovementioned explanation proves insufficient. 
Luckily, Moniot offers additional ingredients of the Bond formula which its imitators 
failed to notice or unsuccessfully mimicked: a) a strong lead actor,260 b) technical aspects 
– musical scoring, editing, panoramic shots, c) mass marketing and an array of Bond-
related products,261 and most of all, d) a clearly visible element of Americana defining its 
Cold War zeitgeist, which made the movie version of Bond differ significantly from its 
literary counterpart mostly in terms of the former being wittier, delivering more humorous 
punch-lines, having, as Moniot remarks, “more sexy young females to seduce,”262 and 
being engaged in more perilous pitfalls amplified by sinister arch-villains with global 
nefarious intentions.263  
 Furthermore, Dodds brings up a few additional interpretations spanning across the 
50 years of the geopolitically significant history of this fictional super-spy: a) a metaphor 
for British imperial decline and its struggle to maintain the role of global intelligence 
leader against the emergent USA,264 b) a resounding rear-guard case against the rise of 
feminism that challenged Western patriarchy,265 c) a demonstration of the post-war 
fragility of masculinity,266 d) a continuation of a longer tradition of Britain’s spy 
thrillers267 and e) a downright retrogressive tale of and nostalgia for Britain’s historical 
                                                                                                                                            
imitation is called The Second Best Secret Agent in the Whole Wide World. One must  give the filmmakers 
at least some credit for acknowledging the apparent inferiority of their piece. 
259 Klaus Dodds, “Screening Geopolitics: James Bond and the Early Cold War films (1962 – 1967),” 
Geopolitics 10, no.2 (2005): 271 – 272. 
260 Sean Connery – a famous Scottish actor excellently suited to the role of 007. 
261 E.g. the humorous slogan accompanying 007 underwear for women: “Become fit for James Bond!”. 
Drew Moniot, “James Bond and America in the Sixties: An Investigation of the Formula Film in Popular 
Culture,” 26. 
262 Drew Moniot, “James Bond and America in the Sixties: An Investigation of the Formula Film in Popular 
Culture,” 27. 
263 Drew Moniot, “James Bond and America in the Sixties: An Investigation of the Formula Film in Popular 
Culture,” 26 – 27. 
264 David Cannadine, In Churchill’s Shadows (London: Allen Press, 2002), 279 – 311. 
265 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 84. J. Chapman and M. Hilton, “From 
Sherlock Homes to James Bond: Masculinity and National Identity in British Popular Fiction,” 126 – 147, 
in: Relocating Britishness, edited by Caunce (S. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).   
266 C. Bold, “Under the Skirts of Britannia: Re-reading Women in the James Bond Novels,” in: Lindner C 
(ed.), The James Bond Phenomenon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 
267 M. Denning, Cover Stories: Narrative and Ideology in the British Spy Thriller (London: Routledge, 
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colonial heyday and Pax Britannia.268 Also, on a purely personal level, John F. Kennedy 
represented an affectionate proponent of Fleming’s269 original thrillers as well as their 
consequent movies and thus helped further stimulate Fleming’s originally meager 
popularity and the broad appeal of movie adaptations.270  
 One might indeed deem the early James Bond movies271 as a mere reproduction of 
binary Cold War geopolitics, however, such a blatant disregard for a much more diverse 
account would inevitably lead to a grave simplification. Although the global struggle 
against communism lies at the heart of James Bond novels, thanks to Richard Maibaum, 
the chief contributor who transformed Fleming’s thrillers into movie scripts, James Bond 
movies must be thus viewed as simply taking place on the Cold War chessboard and 
while abiding its rules and confinements, the main antagonists are oftentimes backed by 
transnational criminal networks and rogue organizations rather than explicitly connected 
to a particular country from the competing block.272 Despite taking place mostly inside 
Spykman’s rimland, the story arcs of the early James Bond movies often venture into 
more exotic locations – e.g. Hong Kong, Cuba. 
 In addition, basically every James Bond movie in the 1960s revolved around 
contemporary geopolitical topics – ranging from lunatic Dr. No and his attempts to seize 
control over rockets launched from Cape Canaveral prior to America’s first manned space 
flight, over fierce arms and space clashes that dovetailed with the plot of From Russia 
with Love to an impressive swath of critically perceived geopolitical, domestic, ecological 
as well as gender issues in On Her Majesty’s Secret Service (1969).273 The last few 
                                               
268 C. Baron, “Doctor No: Bonding Britishness to Racial Sovereignty,” Spectator: USC Journal of Film and 
Television Criticism 14 (1994): 68 – 81. 
Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 58 – 59. Klaus Dodds, “Screening Geopolitics: 
James Bond and the Early Cold War films (1962 – 1967),” 271 – 272.  
269 Who passed away in 1964 and hence was able to witness only the first two James Bond cinematographic 
installments. 
270 To top it all, Fleming was even invited to advise Kennedy on how to topple Fidel Castro. While doing so, 
he devised a range of peculiar proposals – poisoned cigars, exploding seashells or leaflets claiming Castro’s 
impotence. Not all of them were put into practice. Klaus Dodds, “Screening Geopolitics: James Bond and 
the Early Cold War films (1962 – 1967),” 271. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 
84. 
271 Dr. No (1962), From Russia with Love (1963), Thunderball (1965), Goldfinger (1964), You Only Live 
Twice (1967). 
272 For sure, such sinister networks usually turn out to be subsidized by the Russians and later by the 
Chinese, yet it takes Bond and Britain a great deal of time to establish a firm link between them. Klaus 
Dodds, “Screening Geopolitics: James Bond and the Early Cold War films (1962 – 1967),” 277 – 281. For a 
more detailed analysis of the politics of James Bond, see the eponymous article written by Jeremy Black in 
2004. Jeremy Black, The Geopolitics of James Bond (New York: Praeger 2001). 
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remarks allow us to stretch the current theoretical framework of popular geopolitics to its 
limits.  
 Nevertheless, before moving on to the next case study, the sometimes abysmal 
dichotomy between the intentions of politicians and directors on the one hand and the 
actual audience reception on the other needs to be mentioned at least in the passing. Time 
and again has proven that interpretations of movies274 in the 1960s as well as in 2014 
must be treated with caution as an automatic or causal link between the film and audience 
reaction remains non-existent. Even when a hegemonic, prevalent interpretation occurs, it 
cannot safeguard long-term dominance without being acknowledged by its audience as 
such.275  
 Therefore, in a true Foucaltian and Derridean sense, everyone is entitled to his or 
her own opinion and interprets the same issues and events in a different, sometimes 
similar, often contrastive, manner. A pioneering work in this field that seeks to enlarge the 
corpus of the methodologies of critical geopolitics and further shift them to everyday 
consumers, their constructions of geopolitical events and audience research as well as 
reception studies, which have so far been drastically downplayed and turned a blind eye 
upon by (critical) geopoliticians,276 was formulated by Dodds who pro-actively engaged 
in exploring the Internet Movie Database, the phenomenon of fandom and audience 
reactions to Die Another Day (2002).277 In gauging the audience responses to the said 
Bond movie and uncovering particular types of fans, he made a strong case for popular 
geopolitics to adapt to the new virtual-based reality and broaden its surprisingly narrow 
and elitist scope so as to incorporate on-line communities, which offer almost limitless 
possibilities for communication, mutual interaction and sharing opinions among like-
minded fans.278  
                                               
274 As well as videogames, which will be elucidated in a following subchapter. 
275 For more, see: Agnew (2002), Dodds (2005), Dalby (2008), Tuathail (1996) and Dittmer (2010). 
276 Unlike academic disciplines centered upon media studies, anthropology and human geography. 
277 Klaus Dodds, “Popular Geopolitics and Audience Dispositions: James Bond and the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb),” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31, no. 2 (2006): 116 – 119. 
278 Klaus Dodds, “Popular Geopolitics and Audience Dispositions: James Bond and the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb),” 120 – 122. For a comprehensive analysis of American movies prior to 9/11 and their 
search for identity, see: Joanne P. Sharp, “Patriotism, masculinity and geopolitics in post-Cold War 
American movies,” in: Rethinking Geopolitics, edited by Tuathail and Dalby, 152 – 169 (London: 
Routledge, 1998). Also, the author would like to point out that even the most popular video-sharing website 
Youtube shelters a plethora of so-called youtubers who explore movies, review them and hint at their 
explicit as well as more subtle shortcomings. With several channels on movies boasting more than 1 million 
subscribers, e.g. CinemaSins or Screen Junkies, this fascinating phenomenon adds a completely new layer 
of complexity in terms of audiences and their reception, consumption and construction of geopolitical 
events. 
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 However, even when one seeks to venture into the uncharted territory of virtual 
endeavours that have experienced an unprecedented growth since the 1990s thanks to the 
precipitous development of informational technologies, real geographical constraints 
somehow limit further research of on-line fandom communities – the “digital divide” 
separating the main beneficiaries of access to digital technologies – North America, 
Europe and East Asia279 – from e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, and also constraints any 
meaningful research based solely upon online interactions and cyberspace without an 
offline and real-world contextualization.280  
 All things considered, the modern James Bond (movie) phenomenon exhibits no 
signs of subsiding even after five decades of abiding dominant geopolitical narratives 
while flexibly keeping abreast of the latest international development.281 Together with 
the advantages of World Wide Web, the James Bond franchise offers fascinating 
contributions to the generation and reproduction of geographical imaginations and 
traditions that can sustain or disrupt specific national narratives. In doing so, it propels 
popular geopoliticians to rethink through what significance audience research bears, what 
role new media cultures and fandom embodies so that a more nuanced understanding of 
popular geopolitics enriched by a pro-active engagement with audiences may be 
devised282 to bridge real world geopolitical events, popular interpretations and everyday 
consumption of (not only) movies. 
 
3.4 The Dixie Chicks – a cautionary tale for post-9/11 country music?  
Not only does music represent a tremendously powerful vehicle for the articulation of 
dissent, civil disobedience and fierce resistance,283 this form of human expression has also 
been used as a propagandist tool by various regimes and governments which strove 
                                               
279 The famous triadization, an alternative theory of globalization, mirrors and echoes with such divide as 
well. Debated e.g. in: Fareed Zakaria, The Post-America World and the Rise of the Rest: Release 2.0 
(London: Penguin Books, 2011). 
280 Klaus Dodds, “Popular Geopolitics and Audience Dispositions: James Bond and the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb),” 121 – 122. 
281 Klaus Dodds, “Popular Geopolitics and Audience Dispositions: James Bond and the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb),” 126 – 127. For further reading, see Dittmer’s upcoming article on the latest Bond movie 
Skyfall: Jason Dittmer, “James Bond: An Ageing Agent in Skyfall,” last modified December 16, 2013, 
http://rhulgeopolitics.wordpress.com/2013/12/16/james-bond-an-ageing-agent-in-skyfall-2012/. 
282 As argued by Jason Dittmer and Klaus Dodds, “Popular Geopolitics Past and Future: Fandom, Identities 
and Audiences,” Geopolitics 13, no. 3 (2008): 455 – 457. 
283 Songs such as: Free Nelson Mandela or Sunday Bloody Sunday and even a dissident band called Plastic 
People of the Universe in Czechoslovakia and folk singer Victora Jara in Pinochet’s Chile that both 
struggled against repressive regimes with sometimes mortal consequences. Klaus Dodds, Global 
Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 96 – 99. Because of its appeal to the young generation, popular music 
has often been targeted as a subversive element. 
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largely to instill nationalist messages.284 America has enjoyed a long tradition of firm 
interconnectedness between music and politics ranging from the dramatic tunes of the 
Revolutionary War, over the north-south struggles during the American Civil War to the 
protest songs concerned with the War in Vietnam285 and, of course, 9/11 and the War on 
Terror.286 
 When one seeks to explore American country music and its origins, it is essential 
to bring up Walter Russell Mead and his innovative, albeit inevitably simplifying, 
occasionally misleading and from time to time too narrow, division of American foreign 
policy into four competing streams. Mead considers country music a product of 
Jacksonian culture and associates it with predominantly southern states – Tennessee, 
Alabama, Mississippi and Texas. According to him, this folk feeling emanating from 
country music constitutes a “basic [quintessential] element in American 
consciousness.”287 However, such a mere statement hinting at a nation-wide appeal of 
country music remains methodologically useless if we cannot apply it to a particular 
geopolitical backdrop. Thus, in order to better comprehend the linkage, the 
interrelationship between country music artists and the post-9/11 geopolitical discourse, 
an incisive study by Boulton needs to be highlighted.288  
 In analyzing the lyrics of country songs and the methods the actual musicians 
employed to mediate the dominant geopolitical narrative of the War on Terror, he argued 
that, broadly speaking, country music concurred with the civilizational framings – “us and 
them” of the Bush administration289 yet it (has) nevertheless revolved mostly around 
America’s search for its role, values and identity in an unpredictable and contingent post-
9/11 era. Therefore, contemporary country musicians have usually opted for emphasizing 
the glory of American soldiers, America’s unity and shared experience rather than openly 
                                               
284 E.g. Nazi Germany and the captivating music of Richard Wagner. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A 
Critical Introduction, 96 – 99. 
285 Bob Dylan represents a popular musician who stood at the forefront of anti-Vietnam protests in the 
1960s. Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction, 96 – 99. 
286 Classical music offers a wide range of examples as well. To demonstrate: Ludwig van Beethoven is 
believed to have dedicated his Symphony no. 3 in E-flat major to Napoleon Bonaparte whom he sincerely 
admired, however, in 1804, when former First Consul crowned himself Emperor, Beethoven, disgusted by 
the new course of Napoleon’s sequel to French revolution, tore the title page apart and labelled his piece a 
“heroic symphony, composed to celebrate the memory of a great man.” Christopher T. George, “The Eroica 
Riddle: Did Napoleon Remain Beethoven's ‘Hero?’” The Journal of the Napoleonic Society 1, no. 2 (1998): 
50 – 65. 
287 Walter Russell Mead, “The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy,” The National Interest 
58 (1999): 7.  
288 Andrew Boulton, “The Popular Geopolitical Wor(l)ds of Post-9/11 Country  Music,” Popular Music and 
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branding, demarcating, and making a clear racialized distinction between the chief rogue 
states.290 Nor have they been explicitly invoking, unlike the “official and mainstream” 
audience, the Huntingtonian paradigm.291 This emblematic significance of values that 
Americans hold on to so dearly and almost messianically, suffered a crushing blow when 
mildly critical words uttered by lead singer Natalie Maines from the Dixie Chicks on the 
eve of the War in Iraq in 2003 elicited intense and vitriolic reactions among public as well 
as media.292   
 In 2003, at the very beginning of the Dixie Chicks world tour and less than a 
fortnight before the War in Iraq commenced, Natalie Maines expressed the following 
words in front of a crowd at Shepherd’s Bush293 Empire Theatre in England: “Just so you 
know, we’re on the good side with y’all. We do not want this war, this violence, and we’re 
ashamed that the President of the United States is from Texas.”294 Followed by mass 
applause, this cultivated criticism sparked off a public and media backlash of 
unprecedented proportions. As Tuathail pointed out, this particular incident signifies the 
importance of meanings that are made both inside as well as outside the actual text – 
lyrics alone cannot account for the sole explanatory factor in this case. Instead, such void 
vacuum needs to be expanded by e.g. expectations, the band’s history and context.295 
Furthermore, what may strike us as downright surprising is the intriguing fact that Maines 
espoused a much more moderate approach toward criticizing the Commander in Chief 
than other, arguably  better-known, celebrities such as Jennifer Aniston who denounced 
his actions more scathingly296 while receiving only marginal coverage.  
 In the wake of this incident, opposition and boycotts mounted against the Dixie 
Chicks reached unparalleled heights spanning across running over their CDs by a 
bulldozer, publicly burning their memorabilia, receiving hundreds of death threats, 
accusing their listeners of Communism or having a million dollar endorsement to the Red 
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2013, http://www.savingcountrymusic.com/destroying-the-dixie-chicks-ten-years-after. 
295 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Condensing Critical Geopolitics: Reflections on Joanne Sharp's Condensing the 
Cold War,” Geopolitics 8, no. 2 (2003): 159 – 165.  
296 Branded him a “f***ing idiot.” Andrew Boulton, “The Popular Geopolitical Wor(l)ds of Post-9/11 
Country Music,” 375. 
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Cross rejected.297 Also, while dwindling back into obscurity and damnation, the rapid 
demise of the Dixie Chicks between 2003 – 2006 propelled the formidable rise of 
Oklahoma’s Toby Keith “who later ended up becoming the best-selling artist in the 
2000’s decade.”298 To fathom why such a sincere exercise of the rights to freedom of 
speech backfired, one needs to look into the statistics and the sky-high approval the War 
in Iraq boasted on the onset of the invasion before the alleged claims of the weapons of 
mass destruction in the possession of Saddam Hussein proved to be nothing more than a 
crafty stratagem, a deceptive maneuver and a false assumption to combat against the 
possibly weakest rogue state.299  
 Apart from inconvenient timing of Maines’ critical remark, several additional 
aspects concerning this public firestorm of negative reactions stand out: a) The Dixie 
Chicks were traditionally associated with the southern, Jacksonian, stream of country 
music and its geopolitical hallmark of the “shoot first, ask later” paradigm.300 
Notwithstanding their origins and predispositions, the talented trio dared to openly oppose 
the Iraq war,301 b) Britain as a crux, a bastion of massive anti-war protests that swept all 
of Europe prior to the invasion and as the country where Maines raised her critical voice, 
made Americans feel betrayed and deceived by their favourite band302 and c) pro-war 
activists gathered on a website called freerepublic.com fed on and further incited the 
ensuing backlash to the point where radio stations across the country pulled Dixie Chicks 
songs off the air and Maines acquired a letter threatening her with death at the next 
concert in Dallas.303  
 Despite gaining at least partial recognition in the world of music in 2006 as they 
released a new album in an era of waning popularity for the Iraq War and an enlightened 
                                               
297 “Destroying The Dixie Chicks – Ten Years After,” Saving Country Music.com, last modified March 10, 
2013, http://www.savingcountrymusic.com/destroying-the-dixie-chicks-ten-years-after. Shut Up and Sing, 
Directed by Barbara Kopple and Cecilia Peck, 2006, Cabin Creek Films, 2006, DVD. 
298 Shut Up and Sing, Cabin Creek Films, 2006, DVD. Additionally, Toby Keith who stood at the opposite 
political as well as sonic spektrum, is believed to have symbolized the antithesis of the Dixie Chicks.  
299 LZ Granderson, “10 years later, Dixie Chicks right all along.” CNN.com, last modified March 6, 2013, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/05/opinion/granderson-dixie-chicks/. 
Discussed e.g. in: Robert Kagan, The World America Made. George Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 38 – 
42. Shut Up and Sing, Cabin Creek Films, 2006, DVD. 
300 Walter Russell Mead, “The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy,” 8. 
301 Shut Up and Sing, Cabin Creek Films, 2006, DVD. 
302 Shut Up and Sing, Cabin Creek Films, 2006, DVD. Not least due to Tony Blair’s unequivocal 
endorsement of Bush’s invasion was this incident deemed serious back-stabbing. For more, see: Timothy 
Garton Ash, Free World. 
303 Shut Up and Sing, Cabin Creek Films, 2006, DVD. Another great irony. 
  
                                                                                                                                              
  
 
 52 
 
realization of America’s misguided blunders concerning Iraq,304 more than a decade since 
this entire incident occurred, country music is left lingering in a peculiar malaise as a 
politically-intolerant genre that fails to respect its artists regardless of their beliefs305 and 
thus makes a strong case for popular geopolitics to broaden its scope again and conduct 
further research into geopolitical events, their mediation, construction as well as 
contextualization through (country) music, and audience reception. 
 
3.5 Call of Duty – America as a ubiquitous guardian of the Rest 
Video games represent the most recent object of study in the field of social sciences. 
Amplified by their rapid development and three-dimensional sophistication especially 
throughout the past few decades, they have gained substantial academic prominence as a 
consequence of the visual turn in social sciences306 and, more broadly, “visuality,” both of 
which occurred in the later half of the 20th century and coincided with the unparalleled 
boom of informational technologies. Those particular terms coping with perception 
denote vision as a culturally mediated phenomenon and mark an important shift toward 
the emerging significance of the visual, including contrastive ways of theorizing what can 
be seen.307  
 Furthermore, video games, unlike any other medium we have analyzed thus far, 
greatly contribute to the study of popular culture by effectively adding another layer of 
complexity in the form of an affective dimension,308 which allows the players to form an 
active, endlessly immersive and deeply emotional relationship with the game 
environment, its memorable characters and particularly resounding geopolitical 
narratives.309 Albeit facing massive prejudice and resolute condemnation by many 
respectable academics, would-be analysts exploiting the clash of generations or those 
seeking to tarnish (military) video games as an extremely dangerous playground for future 
                                               
304 “Destroying The Dixie Chicks – Ten Years After,” Saving Country Music.com, last modified March 10, 
2013, http://www.savingcountrymusic.com/destroying-the-dixie-chicks-ten-years-after. 
305 “Destroying The Dixie Chicks – Ten Years After,” Saving Country Music.com, last modified March 10, 
2013, http://www.savingcountrymusic.com/destroying-the-dixie-chicks-ten-years-after. 
306 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 105.  
307 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 105. Norah Campbell and Jonathan E. 
Schroeder, “Visual Culture,” in: Encyclopedia of Consumer Culture, edited by Dale Southerton, 1 – 16 
(California: Sage, 2011). 
308 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 105. 
309 Jason Dittmer, Popular Culture, Geopolitics and Identity, 105. Tomáš Hostýnek, “Civilizational Identity 
and Videogames,” in: A Search for Identity, edited by Ivona Mišterová and Eva Skopečková, 187 – 190 
(Plzeň: Západočeská Univerzita, 2013).   
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belligerents,310 this particular field in popular geopolitics offers us fascinating possibilities 
of demonstrating that digital games stand for more than a “lowbrow irrelevant child’s 
play”311 and of venturing beyond once unimaginable in a momentous attempt to build 
bridges and cross the slowly closing gap among Game Studies, American Studies, 
International Relations and Critical Geopolitics.  
 When we cast aside our strongly entrenched skepticism for such “kid’s games”312  
and open up to e.g. the fact that from an economic point of view, the revenue of the 
videogame industry has already surpassed its cinematographic counterpart and continues 
to thrive even despite the 2008 economic crisis313 or that putting blame on them for every 
violent shooting and social malaise (not only) America has experienced since roughly the 
1980s simply proves unjustifiable, only then do we truly begin to comprehend the 
magnitude of videogames in their multifaceted and gripping entirety.314  
 Building up upon the aforementioned assumptions, our open-minded 
understanding of this participatory medium must be properly contextualized in the post-
9/11 era, which has witnessed several subtle changes in narratives and game environment 
similarly as in the case of their lead protagonists.315 Even though the immediate effects 
were mostly confined to toning down any explicit references to the deceased Twin 
Towers, e.g. the ending sequence to Metal Gear Solid 2: Sons of Liberty, Rockstar’s 
decision to make the Dodo plane in their hit game Grand Theft Auto III, set in Manhattan, 
unpilotable or the climactic fight in Spider-Man 2 which no longer took place atop the 
World Trade Center.316 However, besides these understandable “hotfixes,” videogame 
                                               
310 Jonathan Kirby, “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare: A Cautionary Tale for Post-9/11 America,” 
PopMatters, last modified June 30, 2011, http://www.popmatters.com/feature/143987-call-of-duty-modern-
warfare- a-cautionary-tale-for-post-911-america/. 
311 Helga Wawil Souri, “The Political Battlefield of Pro-Arab Video Games on Palestinian Screens,” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and Middle East 27, no. 3 (2007): 537. 
312 Helga Wawil Souri, “The Political Battlefield of Pro-Arab Video Games on Palestinian Screens,” 537. 
313 Todd Bishop, “Microsoft: Global video-game market hits $65 billion, and consoles still lead the way,” 
GeekWire, last modified May 17, 2013,http://www.geekwire.com/2013/microsoft-global-videogame-
market-hits-65-billion-consoles-lead/. See the appendices. 
314 Frédérick Gagnon, “Invading Your Hearts and Minds”: Call of Duty® and the (Re)Writing of Militarism 
in U.S. Digital Games and Popular Culture, European Journal of American Studies 5, no. 3 (2010): 1 – 4.  
315 Jonathan Kirby, “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare: A Cautionary Tale for Post-9/11 America,” 
PopMatters, last modified June 30, 2011, http://www.popmatters.com/feature/143987-call-of-duty-modern-
warfare- a-cautionary-tale-for-post-911-america/. “The Effects of Culture on Video Gaming Media,” last 
accessed April 26, 2014, http://hubpages.com/hub/The-Effect-of-911-on-Video-Gaming-Media. 
316 Rick Lane: 2011, “How 9/11 Affected Games,” BitGamer, last modified September 12, 2011, 
http://www.bit-tech.net/gaming/pc/2011/09/12/how-9-11-affected-games/1. 
Donald Meaux, “How 9/11 Changed Video Games (Briefly),” Examiner.com, last modified September 4, 
2011, http://www.examiner.com/article/how-9-11-changed-video-games-briefly. 
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industry has seen more incremental alterations that would influence developers and steer 
the wheel of their products for years to come.  
 Unlike post-9/11 movies, which have, generally speaking, introduced ambiguous 
and subversive antagonists and main protagonists who operate on an increasingly grey-
shaded morality in order to tap into the widespread eerie feeling of vulnerability,317 it is 
possible to uncover (at least) three significant trends that discern and set videogames apart 
from pre-9/11 installments. 1) Prior to 9/11, the depiction of alien invasions or heated 
military encounters in videogames was, in most cases, limited to distant galaxies, third 
world countries and unforeseeable futures, nevertheless, post-9/11 videogames, across all 
genres and platforms, feature more realistic alien invasions threatening the well-being of 
every inhabitant of a suddenly vulnerable Earth and focus on the imminent, rather than 
inconspicuous, destruction and impending terror of human cities318 – the Halo franchise, 
Gears of War and to a lesser extent even Mass Effect constitute the prime illustrations of 
the said geopolitical trend and thus masterfully dovetail with and mirror the shattered 
reality of the once almost invincible faith in the American dream.319 2) Another trend that 
has left its mark lies in the surging popularity of high as well as low quality military first-
person shooters,320 and of zombies as a method to depict contemporary global issues and 
societal fears, such as World War Z or the Walking Dead series.321 Yet most of all (3), 
9/11 propelled videogames to drop the once prevalent narrative about the lone wolf hero 
fighting against an unknown enemy and instead, concentrate upon teamwork, 
commonality and the evocation of at least partial reliance on allies to overcome all 
                                               
317 Chris Totten, “Has 9/11 Changed Gaming?” VideoGameWriters, last modified September 13, 2011, 
http://videogamewriters.com/has-911-changed-gaming-23385. 
 It is estimated that mere 327 apocalyptic scenarios were used as a plot device between 2001 – 2011. Chris 
Totten, “Has 9/11 Changed Gaming?” http://videogamewriters.com/has-911-changed-gaming-23385.Or, in 
the case of sensational movies touching upon the War on Terror – Syriana (2005), The Kingdom (2007)  and 
even Iron Man (2008) – that explicitly address America’s varied military involvement around the globe, 
underwrite it as a necessary price to safeguard freedom and those dearest to heroes at home. Klaus Dodds, 
“Hollywood and the Popular Geopolitics of the War on Terror,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008): 
1621 – 1637. Syriana, directed by Stephen Gaghan, 2005, Cinema. Iron Man, Directed by Jon Favreau, 
2008, Cinema. The Kingdom, Directed by Peter Berg, 2007, Cinema.  
318 Chris Totten, “Has 9/11 Changed Gaming?” http://videogamewriters.com/has-911-changed-gaming-
23385. 
319 Chris Totten, “Has 9/11 Changed Gaming?” http://videogamewriters.com/has-911-changed-gaming-
23385. “The Effects of Culture on Video Gaming Media,” last accessed April 26, 2014, 
http://hubpages.com/hub/The-Effect-of-911-on-Video-Gaming-Media. 
320 At this point, a videogame project subsidized by the government titled unscrupulously America’s Army 
needs to be mentioned. 
321 Chris Totten, “Has 9/11 Changed Gaming?” http://videogamewriters.com/has-911-changed-gaming-
23385. 
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suddenly crystallized odds.322 It is hence in this period that Call of Duty, the best-selling 
first-person shooter (FPS), made manifest and successfully continues to heavily draw on 
our abovementioned remarks. 
 What originated in 2003 as a daring attempt to counter Electronic Arts and its 
brand new videogame Medal of Honor has over the past decade developed into one of the 
most successful and profitable videogame franchises of all time that entices the players 
across the globe on an annual basis. Yet while both franchises portrayed distantly 
resembling conflicts framed by WWII, Medal of Honor opted for emphasizing the 
indomitable bravery and heroics of a single U.S. soldier amidst a war-torn Europe, 
whereas Call of Duty sought to capture the staggering magnitude of a global struggle for 
dominance.323  
 Sheltered by Activision and intermittently developed by Infinity Ward and 
Treyarch in order to ensure the release of at least one new installment per year (usually 
sometime in autumn), the Call of Duty franchise, does not bring anything radically new to 
the virtual FPS table. However, it masterfully amplified the acclaimed pinnacles of other 
videogame titles released that year:324 conveying believable reality through the prism of a 
cinematic filter, incredibly high production values and the crucially important sense of 
immersiveness, which indeed pays tribute to Dittmer’s assumption about the affective 
dimension and extraordinary persuasiveness of videogames.325  
 Additionally, it has become common sense that Call of Duty videogames rarely 
excel at historically accurate accounts of America’s past military involvements, nor do 
they eclipse and outrival its competition by giving the players a swath of meaningful 
choices to make.326 Furthermore, the fact that the target demographic (between the age of 
                                               
322 Chris Totten, “Has 9/11 Changed Gaming?” http://videogamewriters.com/has-911-changed-gaming-
23385. “The Effects of Culture on Video Gaming Media,” last accessed April 26, 2014, 
http://hubpages.com/hub/The-Effect-of-911-on-Video-Gaming-Media. For further reading, see: Nicolas J. 
LaLone, Videogame Design in Pre and Post 9/11 America (Texas: Texas State University, 2012) and Ian 
Bogost, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (The MIT Press: Cambridge, 2007). 
323 Travis Fahs, “IGN Presents: The History of Call of Duty,” IGN.com, last modified November 6, 2009, 
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of the world’s biggest video game – in pictures,” The Telegraph, accessed September 5, 2013, 
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and the (Re)Writing of Militarism in U.S. Digital Games and Popular Culture, 2 – 3.  
324 Medal of Honor, Hidden & Dangerous and Return to Castle Wolfenstein just to name a few. 
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and the (Re)Writing of Militarism in U.S. Digital Games and Popular Culture, 2 – 3. Jason Dittmer, Popular 
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linear, interactive action movie that takes place in a narrow corridor. Dave Thier, “Call of Duty: Black Ops 
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18 and 30) of those explosive games has a distinct overlap with recruits and active-duty 
military personnel, and thus contributes to the overall interconnectedness between the 
“virtual” and the “real”, deserves attention as well. Raby even believes that similar 
military games can teach stressed soldiers how to better cope with their vivid nightmares 
and help them mitigate the fear of carrying out army operations in hostile environment.327  
 As Thier summarizes: “Call of Duty is linear gameplay done to perfection. It 
yields enough control to make us feel like we drive it, but takes enough away that it still 
dictates the narrative.[...] Call of Duty hides its scripting well, and paces its cutscenes 
with the story”328 all in hopes of keeping the player engaged, which, in most of the cases, 
it impressively does. Despite the occasional snort of derision and snobbery that bedevils 
each installment and its increasingly repetitive formula, Call of Duty offers insights 
unique for and relevant to a discussion of digital games, identity, geopolitics and 
militarism in the post-9/11 era. 
 Four major installments (Call of Duty 1 – 3 and 5) and several expansions 
concerned with WWII embraced an overwhelmingly positive view of America’s military 
pastime alongside “patriotic willingness to support [U.S.] foreign ventures”329 and to 
portray World War II as a “good war.”330 Nevertheless, the Modern Warfare incarnations 
(as well as Black Ops I, II with its multi-dimensional narrative spanning across several 
timelines and the latest installment titled Call of Duty: Ghosts) bear much more 
contemporary significance because of their highly influential focus upon the discursive 
construction of images concerning the geopolitical future of international relations, 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Is One of the Best Told Stories in Videogames,” Forbes, last modified November 16, 2012, 
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330 Carl Boggs and Tom Pollard, The Hollywood War Machine: U.S. Militarism and Popular Culture. 
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imminent foreign and domestic threats to America and the key role of Washington in 
harnessing or containing them.331  
 After having played and methodologically analyzed 7 out of 11 Call of Duty 
“sequels,” the author wholeheartedly concurs with Gagnon’s findings: “these games (1) 
resonate with and reinforce a tabloid imaginary of post-9/11 geopolitics; (2) glorify 
military power and elicit consent for the idea that state violence and wars are inevitable 
[and sometimes the only possible solution to global crises]; and (3) encourage our 
myopia by depicting a sanitized vision of war and by downplaying the negative 
consequences of state violence.”332 Moreover, Call of Duty: Black Ops II employed a 
surprisingly down-to-earth approach deeply anchored in reality to depict future warfare 
when Daniel Suarez, the producer of Black Ops II, hired P. W. Singer333 – an acclaimed 
expert on future warfare – and Oliver North334 who ensured that the game’s visionary 
portrayal of cyberwarfare and drones around 2025 maintains a distinct flavour of 
contemporariness.335 Understandably, it is generally believed that solving issues through 
the barrel of a gun in a digital environment that rarely punishes the players for conducting 
such otherwise illicit activities inspires excitement and enjoys much popularity far 
exceeding that of e.g. a tranquil simulator of gardening.336   
                                               
331 Frédérick Gagnon, “Invading Your Hearts and Minds”: Call of Duty® and the (Re)Writing of Militarism 
in U.S. Digital Games and Popular Culture, 3. Kevin Ohannessian, “How Call of Duty: Black Ops 2 
Predicts and Portrays the Near Future of War,” Fast Company, last modified October 22, 2012, 
http://www.fastcocreate.com/1681776/how-call-of-duty-black-ops-2-predicts-and-portrays-the-near-future-
of-war. Mike Snider, “'Call of Duty: Black Ops II melds gaming, geopolitics,” USA Today, last modified 
May 2, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/lifestyle/story/2012-05-02/call-of-duty-black-ops-
2/54667692/1. 
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334 Retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel. Mike Snider, “Call of Duty: Black Ops II melds gaming, 
geopolitics,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/lifestyle/story/2012-05-02/call-of-duty-black-ops-
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335 Mike Snider, “Call of Duty: Black Ops II melds gaming, geopolitics,” 
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 Although the creative intentions of videogame developers often find themselves 
being filtered through dominant geopolitical discourses so as to ensure profit and cater to 
a particular target audience, the reflection of post-9/11 era, a showcase of omnipresent 
dire threats, Huntingtonian superstition and inner fragility, has found fertile soil within the 
narrative framework of Call of Duty. Therefore, every Call of Duty videogame that 
features modern-day scenarios constructs America as a ubiquitous guardian of the free 
world (the West) whose lone military operations sometimes allied with, yet never 
overshadowed by, local freedom fighters, insurgents or friendly European powers, take 
him predominantly abroad to incredibly diverse locations – Latin America, fictitious 
Middle East countries, real Middle East countries, Russia, America’s own turf, France 
and even the Czech Republic337 – which all remain remarkably familiar for ordinary 
Americans to connect to real geopolitical events mostly thanks to the Huntingtonian 
Paradigm, Mackinderian empire and Spykman’s importance of rimland.338 Neither 
Mahan’s naval postulations nor the present geopolitical strategy titled “pivot to Asia”339 
exhibit any strong signs in the Call of Duty franchise, probably because of their lack of 
any believable military threats.340   
 While conceiving of war as the chief instrument of foreign policy and thus echoing 
a similar “hawk” mindset that has swiftly pervaded national security debates since the 
said terrorist attack,341 the main antagonists of Call of Duty have exhibited a 
correspondingly impressive variety as well – Russian authoritarian individuals,342 
bellicose Islamic supreme leaders,343 rogue American generals344 and Latin American 
shadowy dictators345 just to point out the resonating proximity between vital geopolitical 
                                               
337 Prague, to be more specific, was featured in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3. Despite portraying the 
historical centre quite inaccurately, it elicited overwhelmingly positive response among Czech players. 
338 With the Czech Republic being a notable exception. Frédérick Gagnon, “Invading Your Hearts and 
Minds”: Call of Duty® and the (Re)Writing of Militarism in U.S. Digital Games and Popular Culture, 5. 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, developed by Infinity Ward, 2011, videogame. Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare, developed by Infinity Ward, 2007, videogame. Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2,developed by 
Infinity Ward, 2009, videogame.  
339 “Rise of China and the Return of Great Power Politics,” American Aegis, last modified April 14, 2014, 
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342 Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, developed by Infinity Ward, 2007, videogame. Call of Duty: Modern 
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343 Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, developed by Infinity Ward, 2011, videogame.  
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interests of America346 and their virtual reflections in  an acclaimed videogame franchise. 
Akin to Reader’s Digest, which according to Debrix serves as a showcase of “tabloid 
geopolitics,”347 Call of Duty makes world politics look spectacularly violent and 
sensational at all costs,348 a fact that ushered in more than 10 million copies sold every 
year, universal stardom and several Guinness world records.349 350  
 On a concluding note, the Call of Duty phenomenon, much like the James Bond 
movies, exhibits no acute signs of slowing down, constitutes an ultimate case for the 
renewed interest in popular geopolitics in the post-9/11 America and embodies an 
unequivocal guide toward the fragmented American identity351 in the 21st century that 
entails a brilliantly welded coalescence of almost every relevant domestic as well as 
foreign aspect of America’s shifting self-perception. All this lends videogames, in 
general, much credibility for further academic research and raises consciousness about 
their exceptional potential for scholastic analyses in the face of oftentimes unjustly 
undermined trustworthiness.352 353 354 
                                               
346 See: Robert Kagan, The World America Made.  
347 “Often recognizable because of the language and imagery of fear, danger, and destruction that they 
typically mobilize, geopolitical “issues and problems” introduced by tabloid geopolitical agents (media 
networks or intellectuals and academics or statecraft) are depicted in such a fashion that it now appears to 
the public that these so-called geopolitical problems can only be solved by means of military violence.” 
François Debrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Culture, and Geopolitics (New York: Routledge, 2008), 14 – 15. 
348 Even to the point of highly controversial segments of gameplay that push the envelope one level further 
– such as (voluntary) shooting of civilians at an airport in Moscow, witnessing an explosion from point-
blank that vaporizes an innocent child and her mother in London and beholding nuclear carnage through the 
weary eyes of a mortally wounded soldier. Natalie Shoemaker,”The most controversial moments in Call of 
Duty history,” Geek, last modified May 11, 2012, http://www.geek.com/games/the-most-controversial-
moments-in-call-of-duty-history-1488919/.  
349 Frédérick Gagnon, “Invading Your Hearts and Minds”: Call of Duty® and the (Re)Writing of Militarism 
in U.S. Digital Games and Popular Culture, 6. 
350 That is, until Grand Theft Auto V exceeded them. “GTA V smashes 7 Guinness World Records set by 
Call of Duty, The Avengers, Avatar,” IBN Live, last modified October 9, 2013, 
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/gta-v-smashes-7-guinness-world-records-set-by-call-of-duty-the-avengers-
avatar/427446-11.html.  
351 Together with Captain America and country music. 
352 For an apt comparison of videogames and their respective civilizations, see: Tomáš Hostýnek, 
“Civilizational Identity and videogames”, 183 – 213, in: A Search for Identity, edited by Ivona Mišterová 
and Eva Skopečková (Plzeň: Západočeská univerzita, 2013), who applied the Huntingtonian paradigm and 
its fallible assumption about the monolithic characteristics of civilizations to prove that especially 
videogame developers draw inspiration from around the globe regardless of civilizational confinements. 
353 Another emergent field of academic research concerning videogames revolves around massively 
multiplayer online titles, which offer splendid opportunities for the construction of identities, exchanges of 
(geopolitical) opinions and in-depth analyses of audience reception. See: Catherin Goodfellow, 
“Videogames.ru: constructing new Russian identities in virtual worlds,” Academia.edu, accessed September 
2, 2013, 
https://www.academia.edu/5216353/Videogames.ru_Constructing_New_Russian_Identities_in_Virtual_Wo
rlds, Hilde G. and Jill Walker Rettberg, Digital Culture, Play, and Identity: A World of Warcraft® Reader 
(Massachusetts: the MIT Press, 2008).  
  
                                                                                                                                              
  
 
 60 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
or Petr Kalinič, “Militant PvE and PvP identities in the World of Warcraft: The Mage  and various 
post/modern Forms of Consciousness,” in: A Search for Identity, edited by Ivona Mišterová and Eva 
Skkopečková, 169 – 183 (Plzeň: Západočeská Univerzita, 2013). 
354 Also, a phenomenon called the CNN effect, which hints at the influence media networks wield upon 
foreign policy, has been almost completely omitted from this bachelor’s thesis mostly because popular 
geopoliticians have so far considered such implications inconclusive. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
changing role of American media, see: Richard Davis and Diana Owen, New Media and American Politics  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
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4 CONCLUSION 
After more than a century of various competing theories and contrastive visions of the 
imperial and lately socially deconstructed circumscription of global space, traditional, 
critical as well popular geopolitics stand on a momentous crossroad unique in history that 
of which successful resolution will define the science of geopolitics for years to come. 
Born amidst the West’s heated struggle against Modernists at the dusk of the imperial age 
epitomized by the widespread popularity of Charles Darwin and territorial expansion, 
traditional geopolitics made manifest as a daring response that explores the multi-faceted 
relations between geographical determinants and resources in an overarching attempt to 
derive comprehensible predictions about the future behaviour of states and move the 
global spectacle to the next imperial stage. It is precisely this seeming ability to predict 
that is supposed to distinguish geopolitics from another academic field – international 
relations.  
 While drawing from German, Swedish, American and British strands of 
geopolitical thought, we uncovered striking resemblances among the said schools which 
all, in one way or another, sought to justify, reassert same as foretell the division of power 
in the international system on the eve of the 19th century. Furthermore, the significance of 
certain pivotal areas – heartlands, rimlands or panregions – as well as naval or air power 
permeates the vast majority of those works. Despite being almost inerasably, albeit 
somehow unfairly, stained by an explicit connection with Nazi Germany, the interwar 
period as well as the WWII aftermath experienced a gradual shift toward a higher 
significance of geopolitics in other non-Western “civilizations” – most notably Latin 
America and the Soviet Union.  
 The dim tide of academic negligence and cautionary approaches toward this 
deeply stigmatized geopolitical imagination began slowly turning when Henry Kissinger, 
Secretary of State in the Nixon administration, propelled renewed interest in classical 
geopolitics enhanced by economic aspects in the light of a timid and advertent 
rapprochement of the USA, China and the Soviet Union amplified by a myriad of other 
global phenomena that increasingly eroded and undermined the once dominant bipolar 
logic of the Cold War. When the administration of Ronald Reagan finally brought the 
Soviets to their economic as well as military knees, this abrupt and, arguably, unexpected 
demise of the Soviet Union opened up brand new courses and critical directions for 
geopolitics to embark upon.  
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 It is thus predominantly in this contingent era of unheeded faith in liberal 
democracy that critical geopolitics gained academic prominence and strove to deconstruct 
imperial truths postulated by its antecedent geopolitical theories. Owing to Yves Lacoste, 
a radical French geopolitician, and his challenging study published in the 1970s in which 
he held geography responsible for many major military disputes, his denunciatory eye 
ushered in a widespread re-conceptualization of geopolitics that soon became inextricably 
intertwined with the emergent literature on poststructuralism and, more generally, social 
constructivism. Hence, critical geopolitics, a bold attempt to counteract the perceived 
reductionism of classical geopolitical theories and to impel a more nuanced understanding 
of the socially constructed geopolitical gaze embedded in discursive contextualization and 
flawed, simplified imperial assumptions unable to grasp the multi-level complexity of 
world stage, materialized in Tuathail’s pioneering work titled Critical Geopolitics 
released in 1996.  
 As Edwark Luttwak feared the supposedly inevitable economic backwardness of 
uncompetitive America, Charles Krauthammer advocated the undisputable arrival of 
unipolarity with America at its heart, Eric Hobsbawm believed a new age was upon us 
and Samuel P. Huntington employed a Mackinderian approach to impart his civilizational 
vision which hinted at novelty, yet remained strongly rooted in the Cold War logic, 
critical geopolitics thrived and at last instigated a thorough re-evaluation of centennial 
endeavours to come up with a grand, all-explaining geopolitical tale.  
 The analytical part of this bachelor’s thesis was centered upon the third branch of 
a threefold division of geopolitics into formal, practical and popular as envisioned by 
Tuathail, Dittmer, Dodds and other critical authors. Popular geopolitics represents an 
excellent starting point central to a wider recognition of (critical) geopolitics as an 
everyday practice that occurs even outside policymaking and academic discourse. 
Building up on the Derridean and Foucaldian assumptions about a plethora of concurrent 
interpretations of the exact same phenomenon, five case studies each addressing the 
changing American identity throughout different eras of the 20th century and beyond – 
Captain America comic books, the Reader’s Digest magazine, the James Bond movies, 
the Dixie Chicks country band and a military first-person shooter titled Call of Duty – 
were in-depthly assessed and examined in hopes of comprehending how elite and 
everyday interpretations of geopolitical events are reinforced through popular media and 
passively as well as actively consumed by its target audiences.  
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 While following the patriotic ups and Communist downs of Captain America 
comic book series, we found out that the Jewish origins of the vast majority of comic 
book creators in interwar America impelled them to raise consciousness about the 
European war theatre and therefore displaying Captain punching Hitler in an epic and 
climactic showdown on the cover of the first issue 10 months before Pearl Harbor that 
made America fully commit to WWII, represents an exceptional example of a solid 
interconnectedness between real-world geopolitics and a colourful form of entertainment 
for masses. Furthermore, we succeeded in demonstrating the nation-wide enticingness of 
all the traditionally American values Captain proudly stands for and taps into – 
patriotism, ultimate defensiveness – a factor brilliantly exploited by Captain’s only 
weapon, a shield – and a resolute response when others are imperiled. In fact, Captain 
America ventured much further beyond any traditional geopolitical paradigms because of 
his ongoing struggle against subversive Nazi elements even at home, an intriguing issue 
neither Spykman nor any other geopoliticians effectively addressed. However, once the 
precarious era of McCarthyism dawned upon America, Captain’s somehow downplayed 
jingoism grew exponentially and later resulted in the comic production being put on halt. 
It was only thanks to Stan Lee and the retroactive change in continuity he rolled out to 
annul the excessively anti-Communist storyline – the one that the movie version clung to 
– that Captain America’s initial prominence has been gradually restored since the 1960s 
as this “new” Captain strove to fathom American (geopolitical) identity in its intrinsic 
complexness, a meritable aspect that has been heightened in the wake of 9/11. Even the 
latest Marvel movie installment subtitled The Winter Soldier largely proves our findings 
that Captain “2.0”, the “soldier out of time”, exhibits strong ambivalence toward the 
mainstream Huntingtonian perception of the continuing War on Terrorism and in doing so 
questions how far America is willing to go to protect itself and at what stunning cost 
freedom is imposed.  
 Joanne Sharp’s diligent analysis of the Reader’s Digest magazine serves as a 
foundational, seminal work of popular geopolitics and hence could not have been absent 
from our case studies. Sharp’s insightful journey through the entire Cold War and its 
condensed reflection in Reader’s Digest was heavily affected by the editorial staff and its 
“digested” selection of intentionally denigrating articles on the Soviet Union, which once 
again paid homage to Mackinder’s Pivot paper, so that an unequivocal message about its 
malevolent intentions incompatible with America could be more easily imparted ever 
since Stalin’s horrendous actions had been exposed in the 1930s. Despite a brief 
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intermezzo in the form of détente in the 1960s, Reader’s Digest urged America not to be 
led awry by the Soviet’s superficial veneer of supposed cooperation and held on to the 
dominant bipolar geopolitical narrative. The sudden loss of a simple geopolitical 
scapegoat on the verge of the 1990s shifted the once one-sided attention of Reader’s 
Digest to domestic security issues, which in the 9/11 aftermath bears much significance 
and helps the said magazine remain an immensely popular source of geopolitical 
information available and comprehensible to masses. However, as much as Sharp 
deserves credit for laying the foundations of popular geopolitics, her concise work is 
completely devoid of audience research and the actual ways consumers make sense of 
distilled elite representations of geopolitical occurrences. Further research into a pro-
active role of audiences in reading mediated scripts is thus highly advised.  
 James Bond and his early cinematic ventures in the 1960s offered an illuminating 
xample of a profitable transformation of moderately popular Flemming’s novels into one 
of the most popular movie franchises of all time. For us, it is important to note that 
Bond’s exciting adventures around the globe took place within a larger bipolar 
confinement, yet deemed it a mere geopolitical backdrop against which to fully juxtapose 
the Bond formula. Although Cold War logic held sway during much of the initial period 
of James Bond movies, we clearly witnessed an array of possible geopolitical 
interpretations ranging from a metaphor of the decline of the British Empire, over a 
resounding case against the rise of feminism, to the post-WWII fragility of masculinity. 
Even nowadays the James Bond franchise enjoys considerable popularity with millions of 
fans eagerly anticipating each new installment, which all remain geopolitically relevant 
especially to discussions about America’s and Britain’s special relationship through the 
intelligence services and the post-9/11 reality. Additionally, Dodds’ important remarks 
about the need to more actively engage with the audience, mostly in the form of forum 
debates and Internet movie databases so as to obtain and better comprehend the many-
sided perceptions of active consumers (not only) in the case of James Bond films, 
constitutes another limit of the current methodologies of popular geopolitics that craves 
attention.  
 In the tumultuous era of apt parallels between Mackinder’s imperial protectionism 
and the Bush’s administration pre-emptive war in Iraq underwritten by the concern with 
US access to oil reserves in this pivot region, the Dixie Chicks and their abrupt downfall 
because of a mildly critical statement about the, then upcoming, Iraq War demonstrates 
the overwhelming power of audience that rallied behind a united effort to send the 
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unpatriotic Dixie Chicks to the ash heap of country music history. What may strike us as 
downright surprising is the duality of the actual interpretation of the freedom of speech 
hinted at by president Bush who clearly stated that the Dixie Chicks had every right to 
condemn his actions, yet he also rendered the opposition that was mounted against them 
perfectly justifiable and abiding the exact same right. Stemming from the Jacksonian 
geopolitical tradition, we explored how the post-9/11 development was reflected in 
country music and uncovered a generally supportive trend complicit with the necessity of 
the ongoing war that engenders compassion with soldiers stationed abroad to protect the 
fatherland. The Dixie Chicks unintentionally challenged this narrative and since that, 
country music has been deeply stigmatized and pushed on the freethinking defensive.  
 The last case study coped with the largely uncharted territory of videogames, i. e. 
Call of Duty, a first-person military shooter. In analyzing the general trends of the altered 
narratives of videogames in the post-9/11 era, the author strove to raise consciousness 
about the academic relevance and unparalleled significance of the most recent field of 
popular geopolitics – videogames – and unearthed how Call of Duty masterfully tapped 
into the shifted geopolitical reality of post-9/11 America as well as dovetailed with the 
abysmal uncertainty and appalling fragility of a suddenly exposed and vulnerable 
American identity. Thus, basically all the aspects of a different America in the 21st 
century that in some way permeated the previous case studies – the Huntingtonian 
paradigm, the Mackinderian empire, domestic as well as foreign threats, indomitable 
determination, shattered delusional dreams and the will to prevail – are clearly visible in 
the geopolitical setting and plotlines of Call of Duty, the ultimate case for the enlargement 
of the methodological and analytical framework of popular geopolitics in America.  
 It is apparent that more than one hundred years since its inception a sharp cleavage 
exists between neoclassical geopolitics advocated by the scholars of international 
relations and critical geopolitics mostly postulated by geographers who aim to discredit 
the former and already became a hegemonic force in geographical journals. Yet while 
deconstructing imperial truths and spatiality, critical geopoliticians, in perfecting their 
corpus, risk bordering on social science methods rather than meaningful engagements 
with politics. The second point of divergence lies within popular geopolitics, itself an 
essential subset of critical geopolitics, which desperately needs to broaden its scope and 
incorporate e.g. feminist geopolitics, non-representational theories, audience studies and, 
of course, better grasp online possibilities of everyday geopolitical engagement in order to 
gain more academic validity and a wider recognition. The presented bachelor’s thesis 
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endeavoured to at least partially reconcile this “clash of geopolitics” as the author remains 
firmly convinced that traditional/neoclassical geopolitics will maintain relevance, yet 
alone cannot either address or analyze the flowering of media and popular culture artifacts 
in an everyday discursive geopolitical environment America has so fiercely spearheaded.  
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6 RÉSUMÉ  
Ce memoire de licence compréhensible a decouvert les différences entre deux versions 
contrastives de la science humaine qui s’appelle geópolitique. Le premier type de la 
geópolitique qui est aussi connu comme la geópolitique traditionelle ou impériale 
explique et décrit les rélations fermes entre des locations geógraphiques et des ressources 
naturelles qui influencent le comportement des pays et nous permettent de faire les 
predictions précises. Le deuxième type de la geópolitique qui a gagné beaucoup du terrain 
récennement dans la recherche scientifique s’appelle la geópolitique critique. Cette 
branche essaye de déconstruire les prévisions incorrectes de la geópolitique traditionnelle 
et sa supposition primaire reste dans une école moderne née en sociologie dans les années 
1960 – le constructivisme social. Cette théorie suppose que la réalité dans le discours 
geópolitique est trop compliquée pour faire les prévisions valables, et puis, nous devons 
concentrer à analyser comment les gens dans le monde entièr construient leur réalités 
individuelles. Ensuite, si nous pouvons comprendre la construction sociale individuelle, il 
faut que nous nous engagions et nous nous occupions premièrement du role les mass 
media jouent et les perceptions geópolitiques que media propagent. C’est pourquoi nous 
avons choisi cinq types de la culture populaire – la bande dessinée Captain America, le 
magazine Reader’s Digest, les films avec James Bond dans la sixième decade du 20ème 
siècle, la musique country d’un group populaire Dixie Chicks et, enfin, un jeu videó Call 
of Duty – analyzé leur developpements agités pendant le 20ème siècle aux États-Unis et 
exploré la réflexion des menaces et des dangeurs globales pendant la deuxiéme guerre 
mondiale, la guerre froide et aussi après les terrorists islamiques avaient lancé une attaque 
à le World Trade Center en 2001.  
 La première partie descriptive de ce memoire est concernée du développement de 
la geópolitique traditionelle. Nous avons décrit l’émergence de ce phenomène qui était 
accompagné par la realité impériale du fin du 19ème siècle. À consequent, beaucoup de 
types des theóries d’origine anglaise, americaine, allemande et suédoise étaient créées. 
Malheuresement, la relation direct avec le régime d’Adolf Hitler en Allemagne a 
minimisé l’intérêt de la science humaine et pour ça, la geópolitique traditionnelle était 
critiquée pendant les decades suivantes. Mais approximativement á 1970 l’importance de 
la geópolitique était renouvelée grâce à Henry Kissinger qui a réussi à décrire le 
changement politique dans cette decade. Plutôt, cet intérêt renouvelé a incité un autre 
groupe de faire une clée révision de la geópolitique entière et donc la geópolitique critique 
a commencé à accompagner et critiquer sa branche impériale précédente. Cette division 
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s’est devenue plus profonde après l’attaque terroristique en 2001 et maintenant représente 
une grande discussion parmi les érudits universitaires. 
 La deuxième partie de ce memoire a employé un point de vue different pour 
analyser comment la geópolitique populaire, une branche moderne de la geópolitique 
critique, construit et condense la réalité du système international aux État-Unis. Pour ça, 
nous avons utilisé cinq exemples de la culture populaire qui étaient déjà introduit. Notre 
recherche prouve que cette nouvelle discipline a besoin d’ attention scientifique pour 
exprimer comment les gens comprennent la reproduction et la condensation geópolitique 
dans les media. Nous n’avons pas reussi à trouver une solution simple qui pourait 
expliquer la realité complexe, mais nous sommes convaincus que les options fascinantes 
futures que nous avons introduit – la recherche de l’audience, les theóries « non-
representationales », la geópolitique féministe et la recherche dans les communautés 
virtuelles – offrent les possibilitées exceptionelles pour établir la géopolitique populaire 
comme une branche bien connue et acceptée. Pour faire une conclusion, après avoir 
exploré le développement de la geópolitique pendant le 20ème siècle et au début du 21ème 
siècle, c’est clair que la geópolitique traditionelle maintient beaucoup d’importance, mais 
ne peuve pas seulment expliquer les relations intéressantes complexes parmi les gens, les 
media et l’ imagination geópolitique d’élites.  
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